

# What is a structural representation?

A proposal for a representational formalism

Fifth variation \*

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[W]e may again recall what Einstein stressed: that given a sufficiently powerful formal assumption, a fertile and comprehensive theory may ... be constructed without prior attention to the detailed facts, or even before they are known.

L. L. Whyte, Internal Factors in Evolution, 1965

## Abstract

We outline a formalism for structural, or symbolic, representation, the necessity of which has been acutely felt not just in artificial intelligence and pattern recognition, but also in the natural sciences, particularly biology. At the same time, biology has been gradually edging to the forefront of sciences, although the reasons obviously have nothing to do with its state of formalization or maturity. Rather, the reasons have to do with the growing realization that the objects of biology are not only more important (to society) and interesting (to science), but that they also more explicitly exhibit the evolving nature of *all* objects in the Universe. It is this view of *objects as evolving structural entities* that we aim to formally address here, in contrast to the ubiquitous mathematical view of *objects as points in some abstract space*. In light of the above, the paper is addressed to a very broad group of scientists.

One can gain an initial intuitive understanding of the proposed representation by generalizing the temporal process of the (Peano) construction of natural numbers: replace the *single* structureless unit out of which a number is built by *multiple* structural ones. An immediate and important consequence of the distinguishability (or multiplicity) of units in the construction process is that we can now see *which* unit was attached

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\* This paper (UNB Faculty of Computer Science Technical Report TR05-175) is a substantially modified variation of [1], [2], [3] (and also [4]). In Part I of this paper, we use single quotes when we refer to ETS terminology.

and *when*. Hence, the resulting (*object*) *representation* for the first time embodies *temporal structural information* in the form of a formative, or generative, history.

We introduce the new concept of *class representation* via the concept of *class generating system*, which outputs structural entities belonging to that class. Hence, the concept of *class* is introduced as that of a class of similar structural entities, where the “similarity” of such entities is ensured by them being outputs of the same class generating system and hence *having similar formative histories*. In particular, such a concept of class representation implies that—in contrast to all existing formalisms—no two classes have elements in common. The evolving transformation system (ETS) formalism proposed here is the first one developed to support such a new vision of classes. The process responsible for the construction and modification of both object and class representations is the *inductive learning process*.

As a result, ETS offers a formalism that outlines, for the first time, a tentative framework for understanding what a class is. Even this *tentative* framework makes it quite clear that the term “class” has been improperly understood, used, and applied: many, if not most, of the current “classes” should not be viewed as such.

In light of ETS, the classical discrete “representations” (strings, graphs) appear as *incomplete* special cases at best, the proper adaptation of which should incorporate corresponding formative histories, as is done here. We believe that, without the latter, the process of induction becomes intrinsically and computationally intractable. Moreover, such discrete representations cannot be used as a basis for constructing structural hierarchical representations, as becomes naturally possible within ETS.

The gradual emergence of ETS—including the concepts of structural object and class representations, the resulting radically different (temporal) view of “data”, as well as the associated inductive learning processes and the representational levels—points to the beginning of a new field, *inductive informatics*, which is intended as a *class oriented* rival to conventional information processing paradigms.

# Part I

## Prolegomenon

Those who still wish to build a computational empire on the basis of such troubling precedents [i.e. to assume that the Church-Turing thesis is an adequate scientific and/or epistemological basis for the science of information processing] would do well to pause first on the significance of Wittgenstein’s ever-timely warning that “One keeps forgetting to go right down to the foundations. One doesn’t put the question marks *deep* enough down.”

S. Shankar, Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of AI, 1998

## 1 Introduction

### 1.1 Obstacles toward a formalism for structural representation

In this paper we outline a vision of the concept of (temporal) structural representation which has been in gestation for twenty years. Since such a grand vision cannot be corroborated by one research group or in a short period of time, it is only natural to present it to the wider research community.

Despite the fact that the overwhelming importance of structural, or symbolic, representations in many sciences has become increasingly clear during the second half of the twentieth century, there have been no *systematic* attempts to address this topic at a fundamental level<sup>1</sup>. It is not that difficult to understand the main reasons behind this state of affairs. From a theoretical point of view, it appears there are two very formidable obstacles to be cleared: 1) the choice of the central “intelligent” process (among many possible candidates, e.g. induction, deduction, etc.), the structure and requirements of which would drive and justify the choice of a particular form of structural representation, and 2) the lack of any *fundamental* mathematical models whose roots are not directly related to numeric models. The order in which these obstacles must be addressed is important: obviously, one must first choose which intelligent process to model before attempting to look for a satisfactory formalism. Unfortunately, the second (and principal) of the above obstacles is usually underestimated or overlooked entirely.

Why has it been overlooked? Because, during mankind’s *scientific* history, we have dealt only with numeric models and, during the last century, with their derivatives. The latter should not be surprising if we look carefully at the vast prehistory of science in general, and of mathematics in particular [5], [6]. New mathematical abstractions and overspecializations (with a resulting narrowing of historical perspective) during the second half of the twentieth century have also contributed to such a lack of understanding of the extent to which we depend on numeric models<sup>2</sup>. What has (barely) begun to facilitate this understanding,

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<sup>1</sup> This situation is particularly puzzling from the point of view of computer science, in view of the central role played by data structures and abstract data types.

<sup>2</sup> There are, of course, rare exceptions (see [7], for example).

however, is the emergence of computer science in general, and artificial intelligence and pattern recognition (PR) in particular<sup>3</sup>.

The relevant *concept* of a representational formalism is addressed briefly in Section 1.4 and will be discussed more fully in [8]. Here we simply mention that according to the view expressed therein, we presently have (excluding ETS) only one, albeit *very* primitive, representational formalism, i.e. the ubiquitous numeric formalism. In this sense, it is not surprising that the numeric formalism is, basically, the only scientific currency. With this paper, we aim to change this situation—a goal, on the one hand, absolutely unprecedented in the history of science, but, on the other hand, following from the development of PR and AI.

The complete monopoly of numeric models in science<sup>4</sup> suggests that it is unreasonable to expect a transition from numerically-motivated forms of representation, which have a millennia-old tradition behind them, to structural forms of representation to be accomplished in one or several papers. At the same time, one should not try to justify, as is often done in artificial intelligence, practically nonexistent progress in this direction by the long standing difficulties involved.

For an extended discussion of related issues, see [10].

## 1.2 Historical perspective on pattern recognition: the need for unification

In this work, we outline a fundamentally new formalism—evolving transformation system (ETS)—which is the culmination of a research program originally directed towards the development of a unified framework for pattern recognition [11]–[18].

In view of the fact that newer, more fashionable “reincarnations” of PR (see footnote 3) have missed what is probably the most important representational development within PR during the 1960s and 1970s, we now touch on this issue (which actually motivated the original development of the ETS framework). Over these two decades, it gradually became clear to a number of leading researchers in PR that the two basic approaches to PR—the classical vector-space-based, or statistical, approach and the syntactic, or *structural*, approach [19]<sup>5</sup>, each possessing the desirable features lacking in the other—should be unified [20]:

Thus the controversy between geometric and structural approaches for problem of pattern recognition seems to me historically inevitable, but temporary. There are problems to which the geometric approach is ... suited. Also there are some well known problems which, though solvable by the geometric method, are more easily solvable by the structural approach. But any difficult problems require a combination

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<sup>3</sup> Although several “new” areas *very* closely related to PR—such as machine learning (ML), neural networks (NN), etc.—appeared during the last twenty years, we will often refer to them collectively by the name of the original area, i.e. pattern recognition, or occasionally as inductive learning.

<sup>4</sup> For an insightful explanation of how the stage was set for this, see [9].

<sup>5</sup> The author of [19], King-Sun Fu, was not only instrumental to founding the International Association for Pattern Recognition (IAPR) and served as its first president, but was also the main driving force behind the emergence of structural PR as one of the main fields in PR. His untimely death in 1985 took the wind out of structural PR’s sails.

of these approaches, and methods are gradually crystallizing to combining them; the structural approach is the means of construction of a convenient space; the geometric is the partitioning in it.

Although these original expectations for an impending unification were quite high, it turned out that such hopes were quite naive, not so much with respect to timeliness but with respect to the (underestimated) novelty of such a unified formalism: there was *no* formal framework which could naturally accommodate such a unification [11]. It is interesting to note that researchers working in the various above “reincarnations” of PR have only relatively recently become aware of the need for, and of the difficulties associated with, such an effort. The large number of conferences, workshops, and sessions devoted to so-called hybrid approaches (e.g. [21]–[28]) attests to the rediscovery of the need for unification.

In fact, as we advocate in this paper, a fundamentally new scientific language is necessary to adequately address the concept of (structural) object and class representations.

### 1.3 The general direction we have taken

Returning to the two formidable obstacles mentioned in Section 1.1, for us and many others the choice of the central intelligent/information process reduced to the pattern recognition process, or more accurately the pattern (or inductive) learning process<sup>6</sup>, with an emphasis on the (inductive) *class representation*. On the other hand, overcoming the second obstacle, i.e. developing an appropriate mathematical formalism for modeling inductive processes, has been and will be a major undertaking.

What are some of the main issues *we* have encountered? In a roughly historical order, they are as follows. How does one approach the unification of the above two basic approaches to PR? [11] How should we approach the concept of inductive class representation (i.e. how should the Chomsky concept of generativity be rethought)? [13],[15],[16],[18] Initiating the formalization, how do we generalize the Peano axiomatic construction of natural numbers to the construction of structural entities (in other words, how do we formally capture the more general inductive, or generative, process of object construction)? How do we approach the concept of object representation as that of its formative process? What is the connection between a class description, or representation, and the process that generates class objects? How is an object representation connected to its class representation, and, moreover, how do these object representations change during the learning process? (See [3],[2],[4],[1] for the last several issues.) How do we introduce representational stages? [2],[4],[1] How do we deal with the periodic stages and non-periodic/transitory stages of processes? [4],[1] How do we treat object representations as processes [4] and how do we allow the processes to interact with each other? [1] How do we introduce multi-leveled class generating systems? It is understood that all of the above must be accomplished *naturally* and within a single general formalism.

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<sup>6</sup> Inductive learning processes have been suggested as being the central intelligent processes by a number of great philosophers and psychologists over the last several centuries (see, for example, [29], [30], [31]). An example of a more recent testament is: “This study gives an account of thinking and judgment in which . . . everything is reduced to pattern recognition. . . . That pattern recognition is central to thinking is a familiar idea” [32].

On the formal side, we chose the path of a far-reaching generalization of the Peano axiomatic construction of natural numbers ([33] or [34]), the axiomatics that forms the very foundation of the present construction of mathematics. This choice appears to be a very natural way to proceed. As well-known nineteenth-century German mathematician L. Kronecker aptly remarked, “God made the integers; all the rest is the work of man”. Thus, in part, the *original* logic behind the *formalization* was this: take the only existing “representational” model, natural numbers, and generalize the process of their construction, i.e. replace the *single*, essentially structureless primitive out of which natural numbers are built (Fig. 12 (a), p. 30) by *various* structural ones (Fig. 9, p. 26). Then, one can build on that foundation (see also [10]).

## 1.4 On the concept of representation formalism

One should note that although the following concept of a representational formalism appears to be quite natural, this is, as far as we know, its first articulation (see also [8], [10]).

First of all, on the formal side, we propose that *within* a representational formalism, the concept of a class should be generative and defined via the *basic (postulated in the formalism) operations*. For example, in a vector space, a class must be defined by linear operations only, i.e. one must be able to generate all class objects and only them (generativity) via linear operations. Within the Bourbaki architecture of mathematics, this should be considered as a standard mathematical requirement (see, for example, [35], [36]).

Second, having posulated the primacy of classes in nature, it is quite natural to demand from any representational formalism that the representational mapping  $f_{object}$  from the physical environment ( $PE$ ) to the resulting set of object representations ( $OR$ ),

$$f_{object}: PE \rightarrow OR,$$

(where  $f_{object}(po)$ ,  $po \in PE$ , is the representation of physical object  $po$ ) *induces the corresponding class mapping*

$$f_{class}: PC \rightarrow RC,$$

of physical classes ( $PC$ ) into the representational classes ( $RC$ ), as depicted in Fig. 1.

The uniqueness of the ETS formalism (referred to at the end of Section 1.1) is related to its development being oriented towards the above two requirements, in addition to inductive considerations.

It is also important to emphasize the role of the above mapping  $f_{class}$ , which, in fact, insists on treating classes not just as a figment of human imagination, but rather as a basic feature of reality, as the foundations of biology strongly suggest. There are several reasons why classes have not been perceived as real entities, the main two being the very abstract nature of classes (and their representations) and the total lack of representational formalisms that would support a satisfactory concept of class.

As to the mapping  $f_{object}$ , it should be realizable (in principle) via some generalized sensory mechanism.




Figure 1: The main idea of a representational formalism.

## 1.5 ETS as the first proposal for a representational formalism

From an ETS perspective, there exist two related concepts or representations of object: the global (or Universe’s) and an agent’s. The global concept of object is that encapsulating the entire *formative history* of that object (as an information process in the Universe), while the agent’s concept is that associated with the *agent’s representation* of the object’s formative history (relying, of necessity, on the agent’s representational resources). Although we expect both concepts to be captured with the same formal means in the ETS formalism as it is presented here, we will usually address the agent’s view, unless stated otherwise; in general, the context should clarify which sense is intended.

The foundations of ETS strongly suggests that the concept of *structural* object representation cannot be divorced from that of *generative* object representation, i.e. that of a representation capturing the formative/generative history of the object. Herein, we believe, lies the fundamental difference between classical numeric and structural, or symbolic, representations. In light of this, widely-used nonnumeric “structural representations” such as strings, trees, and graphs cannot be considered as such. *In short*, it becomes clear that, since such “representations” do not encode the formative object history<sup>7</sup>, there is insufficient connection between the object representation and the corresponding class representation. Thus, for example, the framework of formal grammars proposed by Chomsky in the 1950s for generating syntactically-correct sentences in a natural language does not address these concerns, which is not quite surprising in view of his repeatedly-articulated opinion about the essential irrelevance of the inductive learning process to cognitive science (see for example [37], [38]).

<sup>7</sup> As was mentioned in the last paragraph, the latter should be understood not necessarily in the sense of the *actual* formative history, but rather in the light of the agent’s “evolutionary” experience, i.e. from the point of view of the object’s *recovered* (as a class element) formative history.

In particular, the generative issues so important to Chomsky simply cannot be properly addressed within the string setting, mainly because a string does not capture the object's formative history; as a result, there are exponentially many formative histories<sup>8</sup> hidden behind a string representation. From the vantage point of the ETS formalism, it becomes clear that the main reason why the various generative grammar frameworks have not succeeded as representational models has to do with their neglect of *more fundamental*, representational issues, i.e. the basic inadequacy of the string as a form of structural representation (see also [10]).

With respect to (generative) representation, it is useful to note that a number of philosophers and scientists have pointed out the importance of an object's past for that object's representation. Here is a recent example of one such expression [39]:

[W]e shall argue that memory is always some *physical* object, in the present—a physical object that some observer *interprets as holding information about the past*.

.....  
 ... The past, about which the object is holding information, is the past *of the object itself*. In fact, an object becomes memory for an observer when the observer examines certain features of the object and *explains* how those features were *caused*.

We shall argue ... that all cognitive activity proceeds via the recovery of the past from objects in the present. Cognitive activity *of any type* is, on close examination, the determination of the past.

As mentioned in the abstract, we expect that the scientific environment for understanding and investigating the nature of structural representation, together with the concepts of structural object and class representations and its various application areas—e.g. pattern recognition, data mining, information retrieval, bioinformatics, molecular phylogenetics, cheminformatics—will delineate a new information processing paradigm: inductive informatics. To understand the power of this paradigm, it is sufficient to mention how it would transform the widely applicable standard setting of information retrieval, relied on, for example, by all current search engines, in which a (very poor) class representation directly relies on a list of keywords, or on the latter plus logical connectives. Inductive informatics would reduce all such search problems to those of retrieving all class elements based either on a small class sample (possibly a single element) or *directly on the more powerful structural class representation*. Such a uniform formulation becomes possible only with the emergence of the more powerful concept of class representation (see Part III)

In light of the enormous difficulties related to the development of a formalism for structural representation, the best we can hope for as a result of the present attempt is to propose and outline a possible skeleton of such a formalism. We intend to use the proposed outline as a *guide* that will be modified in the course of extensive experimental work in numerous application areas. At the same time, as is always true in science, in our immediate experimental and theoretical work, we will also be guided by a reasonable interpretation of the present

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<sup>8</sup> They correspond to sequences of transformations responsible for the formation of this string as an element of a particular class of strings.

tentative formalism (now in its fifth version)<sup>9</sup>. In general, it is important to understand that, when facing such a radical shift in representational formalism, one has *no other choice* but to begin with a theoretical framework, and only then move to the “data”. Einstein emphasized this point in physics, but in this case the point should be even more apparent, since the notion of *data without a framework for data representation* is absolutely meaningless: it is the framework that dictates how “data” is to be obtained and interpreted. In particular, it is obvious that *any* sensor can only be built after the corresponding representational formalism has been proposed: a sensor can output only the *specified* object representations.

Ultimately, what should make or break ETS as a representational formalism? Since it explicitly postulates fundamentally different forms of object and class representation, the utility of these forms can now be experimentally verified. It is interesting to observe that the latter is not possible for any of the current inductive learning models, since they neither insist on, nor even propose, any—formally or otherwise—*meaningful and verifiable form of inductive class representation*, but simply *adapt* existing formalisms to fit the learning problem (without the availability of adequate concepts of both object and class representations in such formalisms). Thus, one of the immediate values of the ETS formalism is that it is the first formalism developed *specifically* to address the needs of the inductive learning process, and this paper should be interpreted as a *program for action* rather than simply a philosophical deliberation.

The framework’s basic tenets both elucidate the nature of information (or “intelligent”) processes in the Universe and are subject to experimental verification. In this respect, it is critical to keep in mind the accumulated scientific wisdom regarding the main value of a scientific model: “Apart from prediction and control the main purpose of science is . . . explanation . . .” [40] and “Whatever else science is used for, it is explanation that remains its central aim” [41]. *Current inductive learning models explain essentially nothing about the nature of these information processes*, since, as we firmly believe, hardly anything *can* be explained outside an adequate representational formalism.

Finally, ETS suggests a very different picture of reality than that implied by modern mathematics: equational descriptions of physical reality are replaced by structural descriptions (or representations) of evolving classes of objects. We believe that the proposed formalism provides radically different insight into the nature of objects and classes and offers a guiding metaphor badly needed by various sciences. As to progress in the development and applications of ETS, we believe that it would be accelerated within multidisciplinary groups (in which natural sciences are well represented), which, sadly enough, are presently lacking.

## 1.6 Organization of the paper

The paper is divided into five parts. Part I includes two introductory sections, the second of which proposes a new, informational view of the Universe. The substantial size of this Part is explained by our desire to make the main ideas accessible to a wider spectrum of scientists. Part II (Sections 3, 4) presents the basic formal concepts, and in Part III (Sections 5–7), the central part, we introduce the concepts of multi-level struct and class representation.

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<sup>9</sup> Currently, our group is working on applications in such areas as computer vision, sound propagation, bioinformatics, the representation of folk tales, modeling the game of Go, and myobiology.

Another pair of central concepts—transformation and multi-stage inductive structure—are introduced in Part IV (Sections 8 and 9). Part V (Sections 10, 11) sketches some of our preliminary thoughts on learning and suggests how one should approach the ETS formalism.

In view of the tentative nature of the present outline, it does not make sense to strive for a *very* rigorous form of exposition, though, as can be seen from our presentation, formal considerations have not been ignored. At the same time, due to the presense of many illustrative figures, the paper allows for an alternative, visual form of reading, which should benefit those who prefer to visually skim the material first. Also, as one would expect from an outline of a new representational formalism, we put our efforts into definitions, their illustrations, and their justification from the point of view of the ETS rationale. (As it turns out, even without theorems, the size of the paper is still substantial.)

Our greatest regret is the lack of a working example in this general paper. The main reason for this absence has to do with our unwillingness to present short non-informative “examples”, instead of a more substantial one, requiring a separate full-size paper.

For earlier expositions of the ETS formalism, see [1], [4], [2], [3], and [43]. Some preliminary applications of the earlier variations of ETS to cheminformatics are discussed in [44], to information retrieval in [45], [46], [47], to bioinformatics in [48], and to speech representation in [49]. Three theses on learning algorithms related to an earlier, pre-formal, stage of ETS are [50], [51], and [52].

We wish to thank Oleg Golubitsky, Alexander Gutkin, Dmitri Korin, and Ian Scrimger for their numerous comments on this latest variation of the paper.

## 2 Proposed informational view of the Universe

What is the informational structure of the Universe that allows for the emergence of biological information processing? First of all, a biological information processing model must be fundamentally consistent with a prebiological information processing model: the former was built *on top* of the latter. We have assumed that the common, or unifying, central theme (for both kinds of models) has to do with the information centered around the concept of an evolving class of immediately related objects. Moreover, the “description” of the class is closely related to the formative structure of its elements.

Before discussing the existing state of affairs in relation to the concept of class, we present a simple (but, we believe, important) argument supporting the *above uniformity of the informational view of the Universe*—as suggested by ETS and in sharp contrast to conventional scientific paradigms. It is not difficult to see that accepting a qualitative difference between the informational capabilities of the prebiological Universe and of biological species inevitably leads to the acceptance of a scientific principle similar to the well-known and now almost unanimously rejected principle of vitalism<sup>10</sup>. Indeed, if biological species “invented” *fundamentally* new forms of representation that have not previously existed in nature, then this is tantamount to saying that biological information processing—and therefore biological mechanisms themselves—cannot be understood on the basis of physical mechanisms. In

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<sup>10</sup> Vitalism suggests that, in addition to the known physical forces, there are not-yet discovered “vital forces” that are active in living organisms.

other words, postulating two fundamentally different informational mechanisms in nature *leads to the same undesirable situation* (in view of the ramifications) as postulating two fundamentally different classes of forces acting in the Universe.

## 2.1 The lack of any adequate concept of class

It is well known that the concept of a class of objects is absolutely pervasive, both within science (e.g. isotope families, biological taxons, categories in cognitive science) as well as outside it (e.g. library classification schemes, fall shoes versus summer shoes). In view of the ubiquity of the class concept, many areas of information processing—e.g. PR (including speech and image recognition), data mining, information retrieval, bioinformatics, cheminformatics—rely on this concept as the central one. So, since the main burden of addressing the concept of class and the process of classification fell on these areas, of necessity they had to settle on some formalisms, and unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the researcher’s (subconscious) choice has typically been the classical numeric and logical formalisms. However, as was mentioned in Sections 1.4–1.5, these conventional formalisms were not developed to address the needs of class representation, so the researchers have tried to adapt them for this purpose<sup>11</sup>, to the extent that, presently, it is these adaptations that have become an obstacle to be overcome.

Thus, although together with many researchers, we firmly believe in the indisputability of the need for a theory of inductive learning, where we differ with others is in our insistence on evaluating such a theory based on the quality of class representation the theory offers: we need a (fundamentally) new formalism that clarifies what the concept of class *is*, since conventional theories contribute practically nothing towards this goal.

In light of this, on the technical side, the development of the ETS model was motivated by two considerations: the fundamental inadequacies of existing formalisms for class description and by the vision of the class description as a ‘generating system’ (Part III). As a result, it turned out that the differences between the conventional (numerical and logical) views of class and class description and those of the ETS formalism are as substantial as they could possibly be: one main difference with numeric formalisms being our insistence on a particular form of generativity in the definition of a class representation (Section 1.4). The main point is that, so far, the term “class” has been improperly understood, used, and applied: most of what are currently labelled as “classes” should not be viewed as such, but rather as *sets* of somewhat related objects that, however, do not share similar formative histories.

In particular, from the emerging perspective, many universally used *verbal descriptions of classes*, including those often offered in problems in various “ML challenges”, should not be considered as such, mainly because most of them are not descriptions of classes, if the term “class” is to be understood as advocated here.

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<sup>11</sup> Note that, even in natural languages, words simply *name* classes of objects/events rather than capture their (evolving) *representations*.

## 2.2 The ETS tenet: evolution of the Universe as the evolution of class generating systems

In general, the ETS framework is inspired by the view of the universe as a variety of interconnected and interacting, evolving classes and hence class generating systems. What do we mean by a class generating system?

For a particular class of entities, by its generating system<sup>12</sup> we understand a non-deterministic system operating on actual entities and assembling them into larger entities (and eventually into class objects), guided by some hierarchical description of the class. The latter does not mean that the system “reads” this description, but rather that its instantiation *at a given location* is guided in this particular manner. The appearance of a new, or modification of an existing, generating system is a result of the interaction of several such systems.

As will be clarified in Part III, we think of a class generating system as a hierarchical generating system—in some sense similar to an abstraction of the embryo’s development system<sup>13</sup>—that should be viewed as a class generating system that produces class objects. It is important to emphasize that the concept of a class generating system, or *class representation system*, now becomes, in a sense, more fundamental than that of the class itself, i.e. class objects become a product of the corresponding generating system.

Thus, we think of each object, as well as that object’s representation, as a (relatively) stable structural object/entity that is being produced, or constructed, by the class generating system. The adjective stable, to which we will return in the next section, refers to the fact that the same local structural patterns appear in the same structural setting. For example, a single (vibrating) water molecule, observed over a very short time interval, can be thought of as a stable molecular process, which itself is composed of faster-running subatomic stable processes. Also, the production of *different* water molecules is guided by the *same* generating system, and thus quite naturally, we get a *class* of water molecules. In science, the more abstract class generating systems have, so far, remained behind the scene, while their products, i.e. the class elements they produce, are more familiar to us.

In view of its motivation and structure, we also expect ETS to be the first formalism suitable for modeling developmental processes, a need that has been acutely felt within the field of developmental biology:

*Morphogenesis* remains one of the most poorly understood aspects of development. Although the genetic blueprints underlying the formation of many organs and structures are beginning to be worked out, the mechanisms by which encoded genetic information is translated into structure remain obscure. [53, p. 81]

[N]o unified theory of modularity that captures the various uses of the term in evolutionary and developmental biology currently exists. *Nor do we have all the formal tools for the analysis of such systems.* [53, p. 341, emphasis ours]

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<sup>12</sup> For a more formal description, see Part III.

<sup>13</sup> For a popular (but inherently sloppy for a formally-trained reader) exposition, see any of [53], [54], [55], [56].

## 2.3 Structural processes, their classes, and their transformations

It has been known for a long time that “[t]ime has its origin *in the existence of both kinds of physical change, cyclic and non-cyclic, in the natural world that we know*” [57, p. 14].<sup>14</sup> What is the importance of the *two different kinds* of processes?

Any physical process that is purely cyclical may be treated as an atemporal process as long as it is considered only in its own domain, without reference to the larger, temporal universe surrounding it. The successive oscillations of a photon as it moves through a vacuum, for example, are identical, and there is no change that gives a time coordinate. The motion of an electron about a nucleus, or the cycles of two isolated astronomical bodies rotating about each other, have a similar atemporal quality. On interaction with other systems these purely cyclic processes may become non-cyclic and thereby gain a temporal character.

The cyclic process, then, can become a temporal process only by reference to non-cyclic processes. We may refer to the latter as *progressively* changing processes, in contrast to the cyclic processes in which we do not have progressive change except within any one cycle. We have seen that the progressively changing process does not give us our time concept because change in general does not provide a basis for time standardization and measurement. But likewise, uniform cycles of change will not by themselves give us our time concept, because without progressive change there is no distinction of any one cycle from another. [57, p. 14]

Consistent with the above subdivision of all processes into two categories, in the ETS formalism, the two central concepts (besides, of course, that of class) are those of the *structural process* and the *transformation*, where the former corresponds to a generalization of the above “cyclic” process and the latter to the above “non-cyclic” process.




Figure 2: Logical sequence of the central ETS concepts.

Before informally discussing some of the central concepts, Figure 2 gives their logical sequence. The concept of stable structural process is supposed to encapsulate that of a structural (temporal) object representation—from both the global and agent’s perspectives. Or, more accurately in the case of the agent’s perspective, it is supposed to encapsulate the concept of an object *observed* over some period of time. From the global perspective, the adjective “stable” refers to the regular (or periodic) nature of the process responsible for the object’s regeneration. From the agent’s perspective, stable refers to the stability of the corresponding perceptual process: e.g. it refers to a simple fact that, during the continuous observation of an object by the agent, the same “perceptual features”, or subpatterns, must reappear as the observation “returns to the same place”. Since *objects are represented as*

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<sup>14</sup> Although, in Section 2, we often come back to these two terms, they are not used within the formalism itself.

*structural entities* in the ETS formalism, a more accurate paraphrasing of the last sentence is: the object representation, or, more accurately, the corresponding structural entity, is actually constructed during the *interaction between* the observing (sensing)<sup>15</sup> agent and the target object process. It is not difficult to see that the choice of subpatterns/subentities—out of which a structural entity is built—must depend on the agent’s (inductive) experience<sup>16</sup>.

At a particular ‘stage’ of representation, a subpattern in the representation of an object—in our terminology a ‘struct’—is a temporal assembly of the very basic building units, which we call primitive transformations, or simply ‘primitives’ shown in Fig. 3. The latter structs are delineated in Fig. 4 by various lines. *Having fixed the representational stage*, these primitives are treated as indecomposable units designating the basic events associated with the disruption (transformation) of the above—indecomposable at this stage—cyclic processes. In Fig. 3, cyclic processes are called ‘primal’ processes and are shown as lines connecting the primitives. At the *previous* representational stage, however, a primitive can be “opened up” into a *non-primitive* transformation (Fig. 5). The nature of such a transformation can most naturally be understood as denoting a macro-event that is responsible for the transformation of one set of interacting structural processes into another set of processes. In other words, ‘initial’ interacting processes are transformed into ‘terminal’ processes<sup>17</sup> as shown in Fig. 5, where the structural entities delineated with solid lines are, in fact, opened up prototypes of the next-stage indecomposable primal elements which connect primitives.

It is useful to think of a primitive as capturing the non-regular event—or the above “non-cyclic” process—corresponding to the “standard”, i.e. entrenched, interaction of initial primal processes (or the above “cyclic” processes). A typical primitive would have a terminal process that doesn’t belong to any of the initial classes of processes, and hence it can be thought of as capturing an event responsible for the generation of new, or transforming existing, *classes* of structural processes.

In light of the above (and what follows), we stress that in spite of some superficial similarity with graphs, relying on this similarity is very counter-productive, mainly in view of the temporal nature of ETS representation.

So, what is the mechanism responsible for maintaining the integrity of a class of structural entities? In Part III we introduce the concept of (hierarchical) class representation, whose main component is the concept of multi-level class generating system, responsible for “overseeing” the construction of the entities forming that class. The construction proceeds step-wise by initiating the (class) scheme for assembling the higher-level *components* of a class element and then realizing it by (recursively) propagating structural constraints to the *corresponding previous-level construction processes* (see Figs. 19–25)<sup>18</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> The sensors involved, in contrast to the conventional ones, are structural. It is also important to note that all biological sensors are of a chemical nature, and are therefore structural.

<sup>16</sup> A substantial part of the previous experience of the agent’s “species”, for efficiency considerations, could be embedded in hardware rather than in software. From a biological point of view, the entire cell structure (including DNA, cytoskeleton, etc.) constitutes such hardware.

<sup>17</sup> Recall the analogy of several particles before and after a collision.

<sup>18</sup> Note that, in the context of *class representation*, we speak of ‘levels’, while in the context of *class interactions* (i.e. the transition from a transform to a next-level primitive), we speak of ‘stages’. More accurately, when we speak of ‘levels’, we always refer to those associated with the descriptions of classes *within a fixed ‘stage’ of representation*, where each such stage refers to an organizational unit in the (global)

**Primal processes**

**Primitives**

**Segment of the hydrogen process**




Figure 3: Pictorial representation of a process corresponding to a hydrogen atom over an extremely short time interval: three kinds/classes of subatomic entities (first column), four primitive events (second column), and one conceivable event scenario for the hydrogen process (third column).

We should point out that the initial impression of ETS that one might have from the above figures as a very visual formalism is in no way false.

## 2.4 Some preliminary connections with physics

To see the connection between the above concept of structural process and the concept of the elementary particle in modern physics, the following insight should be useful:

De Broglie’s argument began with the supposition that “the basic idea of quantum theory is the impossibility of considering an isolated fragment of energy without assigning a certain frequency to it.” The particles of radiation—and of matter as well—had a *level of existence that was fundamentally a “periodic [structural] process”*. [58, emphasis ours]

Moreover, as also mentioned on p. 27, the very useful in quantum physics concept of Feynman diagram ([61]–[64]) can be considered as a “pictorial” physical version of the structural

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multi-stage representational hierarchy.




Figure 4: Pictorial representation of one conceivable event scenario for a lithium atom process/struct with four of its substructs delineated. As can be seen from the figure, the two substructs identified by solid lines are elements of the same constituent class of patterns, which participate with elements of other classes in the construction of the shown lithium process.

representation proposed here. However, most interestingly, the ETS formalism suggests a compelling explanation of what some refer to as the most profound mystery in modern physics, i.e. that of entanglement. Entanglement is a term introduced by Schrödinger, and it presently refers (in the case of two particles) to the relatively well observed phenomenon of the *instantaneous* transfer of the effects of measurement on one particle to another particle that interacted with the first one at some earlier time, *independent of the present distance between them* (for popular expositions, see [65], [66]). From the point of view of the ETS formalism—whose main underlying assumption is the indispensibility of formative history for representation—the above “transfer” of the effects of measurement can be explained as reflecting the following fact: conventional measurements on the first particle contribute to the global formative history (by recording in it the effects of the measurement process itself), which in turn affects all *future* measurement processes (even those addressing “past” events), since they now have to deal with this modified formative history.

In Figs. 3–5, we offer a (crude) illustration of an ETS representation in physical chemistry, i.e. we present a *naïve* structural representation of the formation of a lithium hydride molecule from its two constituent atoms: hydrogen and lithium. Note that, for simplicity, otherwise important electron-electron interactions are neglected, a nucleus is treated as an indivisible




Figure 5: Pictorial representation of a transformation corresponding to the emergence of a lithium hydride molecule (bottom process) from particular hydrogen (Fig. 3) and lithium processes (top: note the recurring temporal/structural patterns). The “body” of the transform (heavy dashed line) depicts an *over-simplified* restructuring of the two initial entities into the terminal one. On the right, we show the corresponding *next-stage* (lithium hydride formation) primitive.

or single entity, and the energy, momentum, etc. of the various subatomic constituents are also neglected. It is interesting that one does not need to differentiate between atoms and small molecules in the ETS formalism<sup>19</sup>: both may be considered as being stable structural processes at the same stage.

Turning to the concept of time scales (see Fig. 6)—and keeping in mind that, in ETS, a transition to a new stage is related to the incorporation of a new transformation as a next-stage primitive transformation (Fig. 5)—the ETS formalism suggests that a change in the discretely structured scale of time in the universe is associated with some such transitions: a coarser time scale appears as more complex (next-stage) structural entities are instantiated. In other words, once the generating system begins to assemble new, more complex entities, the overall generation time increases. Historically, some of these transitions were associated with transitions to atomic levels, molecular levels, etc.

We will come back to connections with physics at the end of the next section.

## 2.5 Objects as epiphenomena of class generating systems

As the section heading implies, according to the ETS formalism, observed objects are not what they appear to be. This point is not as controversial as it seems if all objects are treated as organisms, having developmental as well as evolutionary histories. Thus, a developed organism should also be viewed as an epiphenomenon of *both* these histories as is the case in modern biology: if we tinker with either one of the histories, we change the organism, and the more we tinker, the bigger the changes become. This is what actually happens during evolution. As far as objects are concerned, when we look at such an object as a chair, it also has its “developmental” (i.e. production) and “evolutionary” (i.e. conceptual) histories. In light of this, it makes perfect sense to assume that any biological representational model should be based on such principles: we believe that during the period of time in which a visual system interacts with a chair, for instance, it actually constructs a generative representation of the chair *as perceived by the viewer*. The ETS formalism suggests such a view of reality.

It appears that one can “blame” classical physics for the current state of affairs in which objects (together with the corresponding measurements), rather than their formative histories, are at the center of attention. The latter, in turn, is the result of the state of affairs in mathematics which, historically, has been concerned only with numeric forms of representation. The concept of structural representation proposed here, on the other hand, brings to the fore the question of how the object’s structure has emerged. Any structure must have emerged incrementally, and both level-wise (within a class) and stage-wise (class interactions), which is what we observe in the universe. For example, molecular structures are now inconceivable without reference to atomic structures. We—together with other scientists and philosophers, e.g. Sec. 1.5 and the epigraph on p. 36—believe that it is such currently unobservable processes that are responsible for the generation of observable structure, and therefore *they* should be of primary interest, as opposed to the observable structures themselves. The latter point of view is quite consistent with the one that emerged about 80 years ago in physics, as can be seen from the following quotation taken from the chapter

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<sup>19</sup> This does not at all preclude the emergence, at higher stages of representation, of macromolecular structures such as proteins.




Figure 6: Simplified ETS representation with different time scales for each of the two depicted stages. The circles stand for primitive transformations and the lines between them signify basic structural entities for the corresponding stage. The thin dashed lines identify entities and the heavy dashed line identifies the only shown transformation. The hierarchical decomposition of each structural entity is suppressed. (Note that the upper stage's time scale is measured in coarser units, i.e.  $t'_0$  corresponds to  $t_0$ ,  $t'_1$  corresponds to  $t_{10}$ , etc.)

characteristically titled “Events” in [59], authored by outstanding physicist and astronomer James Jeans (emphasis ours):

Thus the “world-line” of a particle is, strictly speaking, not a line at all, but is a continuous and unbounded curved region, and must logically be separated into small curved spots—the *particle resolves itself into events. Most of these events are unobservable; it is only when two particles meet or come near to one another that we have an observable event which can affect our senses. We have no knowledge of the existence of the particle between times, so that observation only warrants us in regarding its existence as a succession of isolated events.*

.....  
Matter gives us a rough and easily understood, but not a true, picture of the reality underlying physical phenomenon. *But we now begin to suspect that events and not particles constitute the true objective reality*, so that a piece of matter becomes, in Bertrand Russell’s words,

“not a persistent thing with varying states, but a system of inter-related events. The old solidity is gone, and with it the characteristics that, to the materialist, made matter seem more real than fleeting thoughts.”

Moreover, Jeans (and Russell) go on to suggest a view of nature consistent with the informational view expounded by ETS:

This at once takes all force out of the popular objection that mind and matter are so unlike that all interaction is impossible. With matter replaced by events, the objection is no longer tenable. We see the territory on both sides of the mind-body bridge occupied by events, and as Bertrand Russell says (*[An] Outline of Philosophy*, [1927], p. 311):

*“The events that happen in our minds are part of the course of nature, and we do not know that the events which happen elsewhere are of a totally different kind.”*

## 2.6 ETS as a multi-stage representational formalism

As was also discussed in Section 2.3, the emergence of each new stage corresponds to the discovery and consolidation by an agent of the *first* transformation at the currently highest stage. Thus, together with the new stage, a new primitive transformation is then created on the basis of that transform as shown in Fig. 6. Discovery of a *subsequent* transform at any, except the last, stage simply expands the set of primitive transformations at the next stage.

From the agent’s perspective, the (external) input is a sequence of sensory events, captured as primitive transformations of the initial stage (see Fig. 7). It is quite reasonable to assume, however, that agents might be equipped with additional kinds of sensors, capable of directly identifying some subpatterns, or classes of processes.

A useful metaphor for capturing the above multi-stage structure is a multi-stage “evolving representational tower” which can directly interact with (external) processes *only* at the initial stage(s). In the language of the ETS formalism, each stage records, or represents, observable processes by means of its own primitives, with which it represents the corresponding

structural fragment from the previous stage (thus compressing the *representation* of the external data). Each stage  $k$  of this tower is responsible for the detection of regularities, i.e. stable processes and transforms, in the external events at the  $k$ -th resolution stage, relying on the (condensed) representation passed up from the previous stage (Fig. 6).




Figure 7: An actual multi-stage physical process (left) and an agent’s representation of it (right), mediated by sensors (center).

We note that, although it may appear that the transition to a new stage of representation is necessitated only by the need to deal more effectively with the complexity of representation<sup>20</sup>, the resulting higher stage representations in turn begin to play an *active* organizing role influencing the appropriate lower stages: the degrees of freedom at a lower stage are restricted by the structures emerging at higher stages (e.g. the symbiosis of cells influences the degrees of freedom of the constituent proteins involved).

## 2.7 Facing the present state of science

As an *initial (but partial)* applied insight and until structural sensors are built, we propose to face the *present* scientific reality with the help of the following two perspectives: *object view* and *event view*. The classical object view encapsulates the *common* scientific view of reality, while the proposed event view encapsulates the ETS, or information process, view.

The conventional scientific view of reality is related to observations in the *object environment*. E.g. in chemistry, observations are those related to atoms and molecules (two separate

<sup>20</sup>This results in the well-recognized phenomenon called “chunking” ([60]).

oxygen atoms covalently bond), and physical theories attempt to describe these observations in terms of states of *objects*, represented via the vector space formalism. On the other hand, the ETS model emphasizes a *process* view of reality, in which, as was mentioned above, *transforming* events in the object environment, rather than the objects themselves, are the basic subject of study (e.g. in the oxygen example, the focus is on the event corresponding to the *transformation* or *change* responsible for the formation of an oxygen molecule). Again, the latter view of the environment, which we call the *event environment*, insists on the primacy of the information process rather than on the primacy of the objects themselves.

Given the present state of science, i.e. an object-centered view, one may choose to face this situation, for the time being, by admitting the above two environments and creating an interface between them: the ETS model operates with **ideal events** that correspond to **real events** in the object environment. A real event is accounted for (in the event environment) by its idealized version (its **idealization**), while in the object environment a real event is accounted for by the **realization** of an ideal event (see Fig. 8). Note that the event environment can easily account for, in particular, such events as the “appearance” and “disappearance” (e.g. in the case of interacting particles) of objects as well as various changes in the relationships among the objects.




Figure 8: Event environment versus object environment. In State 1, three objects/processes (A, B, C) are shown. As a result of the first real event, A and B merge to form D in State 2. The corresponding ideal event (primitive  $\pi_1$ ) is depicted on the right. Three subsequent state changes are also illustrated: D and C are transformed into E, F, and G; E is split into I and H; F, G, and I merge to form J.

## Part II

# ETS basics

[T]he above remarks . . . prove that whatever the [mathematical language of the central nervous] system is, it cannot fail to differ considerably from what we consciously and explicitly consider as mathematics.

J. von Neumann, *The Computer and the Brain*, 1958

### 3 Basic level primitives and class links between them

In this section we introduce the basic constructive elements of the formalism, in our case the elementary transformations (or *elementary “ideal events”*).

In what follows, the term **enumerable set** refers to either a finite or countably infinite non-empty set.

We would also like to emphasize that, in view of the present lack of an appropriate basic mathematical language for dealing with structured entities, we must of necessity rely on conventional set theoretic language. We do expect that this situation will be remedied once the issue of structural representation has received adequate attention.

**Notational convention 1.** In this paper, the names of sets and their tuples begin with a capital letter, while the names of mappings are in small letters.

We use the hat accent in  $\hat{\alpha}$  to denote the *special* entity called the name of the associated formal object  $\alpha$ . Of course, “naming” can be viewed as an injective mapping from a set of such objects to the set of their names. ▮

The following definition introduces the first basic concept, that of a primitive transformation. As was mentioned in the Introduction, by ‘primitive transformation’ we mean a microevent that is responsible for the transformation of one set of adjacent/interacting structural processes into another set of processes.<sup>21</sup> In other words, the concept of primitive transformation encapsulates that of a “standard” interaction of the several processes involved.

Throughout the paper, when we speak of a “structural process”—often as being an element of a class of such processes—this should be more accurately understood as a “*representation* of the process”, i.e. as a *structural entity* standing for our current representation of the process.

We assume that a set of standard or ‘primal’ disjoint<sup>22</sup> classes of processes has been specified. Each element of such a class is some *structural entity* whose intrinsic structure is suppressed, i.e. each entity must, at this initial stage, be treated as unstructured, or

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<sup>21</sup> Recall the analogy of several particles before and after a collision.

<sup>22</sup> In general, *assuming complete knowledge of the classes*, including their representations/descriptions, classes in nature appear to be disjoint (see the discussion after Def. 11 on p. 39).

indivisible, and indistinguishable from any other entity in the class. For this reason, in the definition itself we *de-emphasize the concept of “process/entity”* and speak simply of elements of classes.<sup>23</sup> Still, one *must not forget* that each such element is a representation of an observed process (see Remark on p. 58).

**Definition 1.** Let  $m, n$  be small positive integers and

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{C} &= \{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_m\} & C_i \text{ is a given (enumerable) } \mathbf{primal\ class}, \\ & & \forall i, j \quad i \neq j \quad C_i \cap C_j = \emptyset, \\ \widehat{\Pi} &= \{\widehat{\pi}_1, \widehat{\pi}_2, \dots, \widehat{\pi}_n\} & \widehat{\pi}_i \text{ is a given } \mathbf{abstract\ primitive\ name}. \end{aligned}$$

We first introduce the following auxiliary concepts and notations for each  $i$ ,  $1 \leq i \leq n$ :<sup>24</sup>

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Init}(\widehat{\pi}_i) &= \langle C_{j_1}, C_{j_2}, \dots, C_{j_{p(i)}} \rangle & \text{is a } \mathit{given} \text{ tuple of primal classes called the } \mathbf{tu-} \\ & & \mathbf{ple\ of\ initial\ classes}, \text{ or } \mathbf{initials}, p(i) > 0, \\ \mathcal{L}_i, \quad \mathcal{L}_i &\subseteq C_{j_1} \times C_{j_2} \times \dots \times C_{j_{p(i)}}, & \text{is a } \mathit{given} \text{ set of labels associated with } \widehat{\pi}_i, \\ & & \text{such that no two constituent elements of any} \\ & & \text{tuple } \langle c_{j_1}, \dots, c_{j_{p(i)}} \rangle \in \mathcal{L}_i \text{ are equal,} \\ \text{Term}(\widehat{\pi}_i) &= \langle C_{k_1}, C_{k_2}, \dots, C_{k_{q(i)}} \rangle & \text{is a } \mathit{given} \text{ tuple of primal classes called the} \\ & & \mathbf{tuple\ of\ terminal\ classes}, \text{ or } \mathbf{terminals}. \end{aligned}$$

On the basis of the above givens, define  $\pi_i$  as a set

$$\pi_i = \{ \pi_i(a) \mid a \in \mathcal{L}_i \}$$

whose generic element  $\pi_i(a)$  is:

$$\forall a \in \mathcal{L}_i \quad \pi_i(a) = \pi_{ia} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle \widehat{\pi}_i, \text{Init}(\widehat{\pi}_i), \text{Term}(\widehat{\pi}_i), a \rangle$$

(see Fig. 9)<sup>25</sup>. Set  $\pi_i$  is called an **abstract primitive transformation**, or simply **abstract primitive**, and any one of its elements  $\pi_{ia}$  is called a corresponding (concrete) **primitive**. We denote by  $\mathbf{\Pi}$  the finite set of all abstract primitives  $\pi_i$ ,  $1 \leq i \leq n$ , and by  $\Pi$  the set of all (concrete) primitives.

[One should think of a concrete primitive  $\pi_{ia}$  as designating a particular kind of interaction between the (initial) processes in label-tuple  $a$ , the outcome of which is a *non-deterministically*<sup>26</sup> specified element of  $C_{k_1} \times C_{k_2} \times \dots \times C_{k_{q(i)}}$ , which is the reason why label  $a$  cannot point to a particular element in the latter set product: if one were to observe the single event denoted by a concrete primitive, then in contrast to the initial processes, all of the corresponding terminal processes would be “in progress”.] ►

<sup>23</sup> Clearly, the corresponding *real* processes from the same class must, in *some* sense, be similar to each other. The sense in which they are similar is addressed later, in Part III.

<sup>24</sup> Note that we do not forbid, for example, that  $C_{j_1} = C_{j_2}$ . Moreover, the index  $p(i)$  of  $j_{p(i)}$  simply signifies a natural number that is a function of  $i$ .

<sup>25</sup> Both of the following notations, i.e.  $\pi_i(a)$ ,  $\pi_{ia}$ , will be used. Note that  $\pi_{ia}$  should more accurately be interpreted as  $[\pi_i]_a$ .

<sup>26</sup> This is true since a terminal entity cannot be fully identified until it is “absorbed” by another primitive event (see beginning of Section 4).




Figure 9: Pictorial illustration of two abstract primitives (left) and three corresponding concrete primitives (right). The last two concrete primitives belong to the second abstract primitive. The initial classes are marked as various shapes on the top, while the terminal classes are shown on the bottom. Unfortunately, the corresponding shape does not distinguish between the class, in an abstract primitive, and its element, in the concrete primitive. (The only processes identified are the initials of  $\pi_{2b}$ :  $b = \langle c_i^1, c_j^2, c_k^3 \rangle$ , where  $c_t^s$  is the  $t^{\text{th}}$  process from primal class  $C_s$ .)

As was mentioned in the Introduction, in general, one can think of an abstract primitive  $\pi_i$  as an entity responsible for the modification of existing or generation of new primal classes. In a formal setting, however, an abstract primitive can be thought of as simply transforming a tuple of initial classes,  $\text{Init}(\widehat{\pi}_i)$ , into a tuple of terminal classes,  $\text{Term}(\widehat{\pi}_i)$ .

**Remark 1 (neurons).** We would like to draw one’s attention to the similarity between our primitives and biological neurons, which in this case is less superficial than that between the units of (artificial) neural networks and neurons: we expect that a neuron plays a similar *representational* role as a primitive does and also that their representational structures are analogous. ▮

**Remark 2 (selection of primitives).**<sup>27</sup> Regarding the selection of primitives, one cannot overestimate the following point: as was mentioned above, the ETS formalism insists on approaching the process of “data” representation afresh and in a much more careful manner than is traditional in information processing and other sciences. ETS suggests that, from an informational point of view, “data” should now be approached and treated in a *generative setting*. In other words, as will become clear from Part III, data emerges already partitioned into classes, where the elements of a class are entities “produced” by the corresponding class generating system, which essentially represents the class. Thus, a concrete data representation must now be treated as the result of an *appropriate* class generating system, ensuring that the object and class representations are properly correlated. This is definitely not the case with conventional generative (including graph) grammar models, in which the *nature of data representation* is not addressed and is, therefore, not at all correlated with the corresponding generative grammar (e.g. strings do not come with grammars embedded in, or attached to, them). Hence, the selection of primitives should be approached in this light: they are basic class transforming events in a carefully chosen process view of the environment, i.e. *the representation of an object refers to a relevant structural process in such an environment*. In particular, we strongly recommend that all attempts to adapt conventional discrete “representations” (e.g. strings, trees, and graphs) to the above generative setting be abandoned, as they *impede investigation into the relevant generative mechanisms based on the hypothesized formative histories of objects in the environment*.

In regard to the number and structure of primitives, we expect that an appropriate

<sup>27</sup> See also Important Remark 4 on p. 63.

*generalization* of the situation discovered in elementary particle physics will hold true: the number of different vertices in Feynman diagrams is quite small and all of them have similar structure (see, for example, [63]). ▀

It is useful to note, however, that despite the immediate analogy between our primitives and the “vertices” of Feynman diagrams (see, for example, [61]–[64]), the approach proposed here is a much more careful and general development, from the more abstract point of view of a representational formalism.

**Notational convention 2.** To simplify the notation in what follows, instead of  $\text{Init}(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}})$  or  $\text{Term}(\widehat{\boldsymbol{\pi}})$ , we will use the notation  $\text{Init}(\boldsymbol{\pi})$  or  $\text{Term}(\boldsymbol{\pi})$ , respectively, i.e. we drop the hat accents.

Also, for the above primitives  $\boldsymbol{\pi}_i$  and  $\pi_{ia}$ , we will use the following convenient notations:

$$\begin{aligned} \overline{\text{class}}(\boldsymbol{\pi}_i, r) & \quad \text{as referring to the } r^{\text{th}} \text{ class } C_{j_r} \text{ in the tuple } \text{Init}(\boldsymbol{\pi}_i), \\ \underline{\text{class}}(\boldsymbol{\pi}_i, r) & \quad \text{as referring to the } r^{\text{th}} \text{ class } C_{k_r} \text{ in the tuple } \text{Term}(\boldsymbol{\pi}_i). \quad \blacktriangleright \end{aligned}$$

The following definition might be viewed as a continuation of (or as closely related to) the previous one: in contrast to Definition 3, it introduces two closely connected relations that are *all potential*—but *not yet observed*—relations among pairs of primitives.

**Definition 2.** Based on the definition of the abstract primitive, one can introduce the following relation  $\mathbf{CL}_{\mathbb{C}, \boldsymbol{\Pi}}$ ,

$$\mathbf{CL}_{\mathbb{C}, \boldsymbol{\Pi}} \subseteq \boldsymbol{\Pi} \times \mathbb{N}_{\text{Term}} \times \boldsymbol{\Pi} \times \mathbb{N}_{\text{Init}},$$

with

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{N}_{\text{Term}} &= \left\{ u \in \mathbb{N} \mid 1 \leq u \leq \max_i (|\text{Term}(\boldsymbol{\pi}_i)|) \right\} \\ \mathbb{N}_{\text{Init}} &= \left\{ v \in \mathbb{N} \mid 1 \leq v \leq \max_j (|\text{Init}(\boldsymbol{\pi}_j)|) \right\}, \end{aligned}$$

defined as follows

$$\mathbf{CL}_{\mathbb{C}, \boldsymbol{\Pi}} = \left\{ \langle \boldsymbol{\pi}_i, u_i, \boldsymbol{\pi}_j, v_j \rangle \mid \boldsymbol{\pi}_i, \boldsymbol{\pi}_j \in \boldsymbol{\Pi}, \quad \underline{\text{class}}(\boldsymbol{\pi}_i, u_i) = \overline{\text{class}}(\boldsymbol{\pi}_j, v_j), \right. \\ \left. u_i \leq |\text{Term}(\boldsymbol{\pi}_i)|, \quad v_j \leq |\text{Init}(\boldsymbol{\pi}_j)| \right\}.$$

We call this relation a **class link between abstract primitives**.

We also apply similar terminology and notation to the corresponding (concrete) primitives and speak of the (enumerable) relation  $\mathbf{CL}_{\mathbb{C}, \boldsymbol{\Pi}}$ ,

$$\mathbf{CL}_{\mathbb{C}, \boldsymbol{\Pi}} \subseteq \boldsymbol{\Pi} \times \mathbb{N}_{\text{Term}} \times \boldsymbol{\Pi} \times \mathbb{N}_{\text{Init}},$$

defined as follows

$$\text{CL}_{\mathcal{C}, \Pi} = \left\{ \langle \pi_{ia}, u_i, \pi_{jb}, v_j \rangle \mid \pi_{ia}, \pi_{jb} \in \Pi, \quad \underline{\text{class}}(\pi_i, u_i) = \overline{\text{class}}(\pi_j, v_j), \right. \\ \left. u_i \leq |\text{Term}(\pi_{ia})|, \quad v_j \leq |\text{Init}(\pi_{jb})| \right\}.$$

Since, *in contrast to the situation with initial entities*, none of the (concrete) terminal entities for *independently considered* concrete primitive  $\pi_{ia}$  can be identified (see the last paragraph in Def. 1), it is natural to postulate that, if the above pair  $\langle \pi_{ia}, \pi_{jb} \rangle$  of concrete primitives has been *actually observed*, the non-determinism with respect to the corresponding concrete terminal process is eliminated, i.e. what has in fact been observed is a concrete process “connecting” the two primitives. In other words, we postulate that the observed “connecting” process is, in fact, the  $v_j$ ’th element in label  $b$ . We call relation  $\text{CL}_{\mathcal{C}, \Pi}$  a **class link between concrete primitives** (see Fig. 10).

For any set  $\Pi_0$ ,  $\Pi_0 \subseteq \Pi$ , we will use the notation  $\text{CL}_{\mathcal{C}, \Pi_0}$  to denote the subset of  $\text{CL}_{\mathcal{C}, \Pi}$  in which all  $\pi_{ia}$ ’s and  $\pi_{jb}$ ’s are from  $\Pi_0$ . ▶




Figure 10: Generic element of the relation  $\text{CL}_{\mathcal{C}, \Pi}$ , where  $c$  is a structural entity from class  $C_k$ .

Thus, a class link between concrete primitives signifies the fact that one of the structural entities produced by the first primitive becomes (at certain point in time) an “input” to the second primitive.

## 4 Structs and struct assemblies

From the point of view of an agent interacting with its environment, it is quite natural to expect that, in addition to the *ability to observe primitives*, the agent’s sensors must have the *capability of recording the interrelationships* among observed pairs of primitives. (The latter is accomplished by detecting primal structural processes first, and then inferring the primitives which are “connected” by them.) These primitives and their interconnections can be thought of as representing a *macroevent*, or “structural history”.

**Definition 3.** A **struct**  $\sigma$  is defined as the following pair

$$\sigma = \langle \Pi_\sigma, \text{SL}_\sigma \rangle,$$

where  $\Pi_\sigma$  is a finite subset of  $\Pi$  satisfying the condition that, for any two of its elements  $\pi_{ia}, \pi_{j\mathbf{b}} \in \Pi_\sigma$ , no constituent element of tuple  $\mathbf{a}$  is equal to a constituent element of tuple  $\mathbf{b}$ , and the relation **struct link**  $\text{SL}_\sigma$  is a finite subset of  $\text{CL}_{\mathbb{C}, \Pi_\sigma}$  such that:

$$\forall \langle \pi_{ia}, u_i, \pi_{j\mathbf{b}}, v_j \rangle \in \text{SL}_\sigma \quad (\mathbf{a} \in \mathcal{L}_i, \mathbf{b} \in \mathcal{L}_j)$$

- (i) the *directed* graph of the following (auxiliary) binary relation<sup>28</sup> representing the projection of  $\text{SL}_\sigma$  onto  $\Pi_\sigma \times \Pi_\sigma$

$$\text{ATTACH}_\sigma = \left\{ \langle \pi_{ia}, \pi_{j\mathbf{b}} \rangle \mid \langle \pi_{ia}, u_i, \pi_{j\mathbf{b}}, v_j \rangle \in \text{SL}_\sigma \right\}$$

is connected and acyclic<sup>29</sup>

- (ii)  $\forall \langle \pi_{ia}, u_i, \pi_{j\mathbf{b}}, v_j \rangle, \langle \pi_{i'\mathbf{a}'}, u_{i'}, \pi_{j'\mathbf{b}'}, v_{j'} \rangle \in \text{SL}_\sigma$

$$\pi_{ia} = \pi_{i'\mathbf{a}'}, u_i = u_{i'} \iff \pi_{j\mathbf{b}} = \pi_{j'\mathbf{b}'}, v_j = v_{j'},$$

i.e. any terminal process can be connected to at most one initial process, and visa versa.

The set of all structs will be denoted  $\Sigma$ , and when  $\Pi_\sigma = \emptyset$ , struct  $\sigma$  will be called the **null struct**, denoted  $\theta$ . ▶

Thus, when forming a struct  $\sigma$ ,  $\text{ATTACH}_\sigma$  is the result of the sensors having recorded the various observed interrelationships among pairs of primitives. Note the role of the  $\text{ATTACH}_\sigma$  relation: two *separately-observed* primitives cannot reliably be attached to each other, since, by Def. 1, the specification of a terminal class yields an “incomplete” element of that class; however the “completed” element is obviously necessary to equate this terminal with a particular initial (which is a completed element of an initial class). Hence, the basic role of a sensor is to specify the relation  $\text{ATTACH}_\sigma$ , and therefore structs themselves.

We note that *when drawing* a struct  $\sigma$ , its primitives should be positioned in the following way: for any two *attached* primitives, the top primitive should be the one that “precedes” the bottom one in the binary relation  $\text{ATTACH}_\sigma$  (see Fig. 11).

It is important to note that the above definition suggests a far-reaching structural generalization of the Peano (inductive) construction of natural numbers ([6], [5], see also Fig. 12): we still deal with the temporal, or inductive, order of steps (not structures), in which small sets of primitive transforms are added atemporally in a *single* inductive step (e.g.  $\{\pi_{1a}, \pi_{2f}\}$  in  $\sigma_1$  in Fig. 11). However, the resulting binary relation between primitives cannot now be interpreted, or understood, as a simple linearly ordered relation but is a more complex structure.

**Important Remark 1.** Besides this immediate side of the generalization, one should note that, while a natural number records the simplest, linear sequence of (structurally) identical events, a struct records a temporal structure composed out of a variety of structural

<sup>28</sup> The vertices of such an **attachment graph** are the elements of the relation’s underlying set and the edges are defined by the ordered pairs of the relation. We will call this relation **attachment between primitives**.

<sup>29</sup> A graph without cycles is called acyclic.




Figure 11: Two structs  $\sigma_1$  and  $\sigma_2$ .




Figure 12: (a) The single primitive involved in the ETS representation of natural numbers. (b) Structs representing the numbers 1, 2, and 3.

events. Thus, obviously, there are reasons to believe that *various non-temporal structures can be extracted more reliably* from this richer “temporal tapestry” as compared to that provided by a numeric representation. ▀

We now introduce a part-whole relation between two structs.

**Definition 4.** For two structs  $\sigma_1 = \langle \Pi_{\sigma_1}, \text{SL}_{\sigma_1} \rangle$  and  $\sigma_2 = \langle \Pi_{\sigma_2}, \text{SL}_{\sigma_2} \rangle$ , we say that  $\sigma_1$

is a **substruct** of  $\sigma_2$ , denoted  $\sigma_1 \in \sigma_2$ , if

$$\Pi_{\sigma_1} \subseteq \Pi_{\sigma_2} \quad \text{and} \quad \text{SL}_{\sigma_1} \subseteq \text{SL}_{\sigma_2}.$$

►

The following important but non-central definition will be useful throughout the paper.

**Definition 5.** By a **relabeling** we understand an injective mapping  $f$  with domain  $\mathcal{L}$ ,  $\mathcal{L} \subseteq \bigcup_{i=1}^n \mathcal{L}_i$  ( $\mathcal{L}_i$  is the set of labels associated with  $\widehat{\pi}_i$ ),

$$f: \mathcal{L} \rightarrow \bigcup_{i=1}^n \mathcal{L}_i$$

such that

$$\forall i \quad f(\mathcal{L} \cap \mathcal{L}_i) \subseteq \mathcal{L}_i.$$

►

To relate two structs based on their common substructures (for example, see Fig. 13), we must be able to “intelligently” (but consistently) modify the incidental labeling of the constituent primitives of one of the structs in such a way that the substructures, i.e. substructs, of interest become identical.

**Definition 6.** For a struct

$$\sigma = \langle \Pi_\sigma, \text{SL}_\sigma \rangle$$

and a relabeling  $f: \mathcal{L} \rightarrow \bigcup_{i=1}^n \mathcal{L}_i$ , where

$$\mathcal{L} \supseteq \{a \mid \pi_i(a) \in \Pi_\sigma\},$$

the **reabeled struct**

$$\sigma\{f\} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle \Pi_{\sigma\{f\}}, \text{SL}_{\sigma\{f\}} \rangle$$

is defined as

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi_{\sigma\{f\}} &= \left\{ \pi_{if(a)} \mid \pi_{ia} \in \Pi_\sigma \right\} \\ \text{SL}_{\sigma\{f\}} &= \left\{ \langle \pi_i(f(a)), u_i, \pi_j(f(b)), v_j \rangle \mid \langle \pi_i(a), u_i, \pi_j(b), v_j \rangle \in \text{SL}_\sigma \right\} \end{aligned}$$

(see Fig. 13).

►

The following definition introduces the concept of a *structurally identical* class of structs, i.e. those structs which differ *only* in the (provisional) labelings of their primitives.




Figure 13: A struct  $\sigma_1$  (left), a relabeled struct  $\sigma_1\{f\}$  (center), and a third struct  $\sigma_2$  (right). Relabeling reveals some structural similarity (dashed line) between  $\sigma_1\{f\}$  and  $\sigma_2$ .




Figure 14: Two structurally identical struts.

**Definition 7.** Two struts  $\sigma_1, \sigma_2$  will be called **structurally identical**, denoted  $\sigma_1 \sim \sigma_2$ , if

$$\exists f \quad \sigma_2 = \sigma_1\{f\}.$$

The corresponding equivalence class containing  $\sigma_1$  will be denoted  $\llbracket \sigma_1 \rrbracket$  and is called an **abstract struct**. ▶

We now introduce the basic operation on struts, in which the involved struts are allowed

to overlap. The latter condition is useful, for example, when putting together several observed but overlapping structs.

**Definition 8.** Given several structs  $\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots, \sigma_r$ , where  $\sigma_i = \langle \Pi_{\sigma_i}, \text{SL}_{\sigma_i} \rangle$ , if the pair

$$\sigma = \left\langle \bigcup_{i=1}^r \Pi_{\sigma_i}, \bigcup_{i=1}^r \text{SL}_{\sigma_i} \right\rangle$$

is a valid struct then this struct is called the **assembly of structs**  $\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots, \sigma_r$  and is denoted

$$\sigma = \mathcal{A}(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots, \sigma_r).$$

►

We note that if several structs are not assemblable, it means that they either represent an inconsistent, or contradictory, view of the environment, i.e. it is not possible that all corresponding macroevents occur, or they form disconnected structs (or both). However, the absence of a link between two particular concrete primitives in a struct does not preclude its assemblability with another struct that contains a link between the same two primitives.

Moreover, it is important to note that the legality and result of the assembly of several structs are affected by the particular labeling of their primitives, i.e. a relabeling of one of the structs may change the *legality* and/or *result* of their assembly (see Figs. 15 and 16).

Observe that, similar to the above situation with attaching two separately-observed primitives (see p. 29), two separately-observed structs *with no overlap* (i.e. with no primitives in common) cannot reliably be “attached” to each other. The only way to resolve this potential ambiguity is to actually *observe* a third struct that overlaps both of the structs in question.

It is not difficult to see that the following properties hold:

- (i) for a struct  $\sigma$  and relabelings  $f$  of struct  $\sigma$  and  $g$  of struct  $\sigma\{f\}$ , we have

$$(\sigma\{f\})\{g\} = \sigma\{g \circ f\}$$

- (ii) for structs  $\sigma$  and  $\gamma$ , if  $\sigma = \gamma\{f\}$ , then there exists the **inverse relabeling**  $f^{-1}$  of struct  $\sigma$  such that  $\sigma\{f^{-1}\} = \gamma$

- (iii) if struct  $\sigma = \mathcal{A}(\alpha, \beta)$  and  $f$  is a relabeling of  $\sigma$ , then

$$\mathcal{A}(\alpha\{f\}, \beta\{f\}) = (\mathcal{A}(\alpha, \beta))\{f\}.$$







Figure 15: Three struts (top row) and their assembly. Note that the second link connecting  $\pi_{3k}$  and  $\pi_{2g}$  in the assembly comes from  $\sigma_1$  (but not from  $\sigma_3$ , despite the delineation of  $\sigma_3$  with a bold line). Also note that assembly  $\mathcal{A}(\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$  is not legal, i.e. does not exist.



$$\mathcal{A}(\sigma_1\{f\}, \sigma_2, \sigma_3)$$

Figure 16: The three structs from Figure 15, the first one of which is *relabelled*, and their assembly.

## Part III

# Classes of structural entities

The Universe does not consist of ready, finished objects, but instead represents a collection of processes in which objects continuously appear, change, and are destroyed. Nevertheless, from this it does not follow that they [objects] do not have a definite form of existence, that they are unstable, or that they are indistinguishable among themselves. However much an object changes, up to a certain point, it remains particularly *that*—and not any other—qualitatively definite object. . . .

*Quality* is the essential definiteness of an object, due to which it is, first, *that* object and not any other, and second, that it is different from other objects. The quality of an object, as a rule, is not reducible to its individual properties; rather it is connected with the object as a whole, captures it fully, and is from it.<sup>a</sup> . . . Together with qualitative definiteness, all objects also possess quantitative definiteness: definite size, number, volume, . . . .

*Quantity* is that definiteness of an object due to which (in reality or in thought) it could be subdivided into homogeneous parts<sup>b</sup> that are then agglomerated. Homogeneity (the resemblance, similarity) of parts of objects is the distinguishing feature of quantity.

*The distinctions between objects that are not similar to each other carry qualitative character [i.e. they belong to different classes], while distinctions among similar objects carry quantitative character. . . .* The exceptionally broad applicability of mathematical theories in the different domains of natural sciences and engineering can be explained by the fact that mathematics studies mainly quantitative relationships. Quality cannot be reduced to quantity, as metaphysicists attempt.

Entry on “Quality and Quantity” in *Philosophical Dictionary*, ed. I. T. Frolov, 5<sup>th</sup> edition, Moscow, 1987 (our translation from Russian and our emphasis)

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<sup>a</sup> Note that, in ETS, it is the concept of class representation that captures this concept of quality.

<sup>b</sup> See also Fig. 12.

In this part, we propose a radically different view of the Universe as formed solely of *interacting and evolving classes*. We must reemphasize that the material presented in this part should be viewed as being an early formalization of the principal ETS concepts, centered around the concept of class.

We briefly address the nature of *classes of structural processes*, which also clarifies the nature of primal classes (Def. 1). As was mentioned in the Introduction, the concept of class outlined here is much closer to that emerging from the recent research in evolutionary developmental biology<sup>30</sup>, in which such processes as those implemented by regulatory (Hox) genes [68] play a central role, in contrast to processes more popular in classical biology and pattern recognition (i.e. in contrast to feature-based classes): “The embryo does not contain a description of the animal to which it will give rise, rather it contains a generative program for making it. . . . There are thus no genes for “arm” or “leg” as such, but specific genes which become active during their formation.” [56, pp. 199–200]

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<sup>30</sup> Three popular references are [56], [54], and [55], and two of the standard ones are [67] and [68].

Moreover, the entire embryo development process (starting from a single fertilized egg cell) could serve as a suggestive example of a physical embodiment of the class generating process postulated below.

The concept of representational level is directly associated with those of *class*, and hence *object*, representations. Such *levels* should not be confused with the *stages* introduced in the next Part, which are associated with still-larger jumps in the “resolution” of representation (involving the substitution of observed macro-transformations by next-stage primitives).

## 5 Single-level class representations

In this section, we first introduce the simplest concept of class, i.e. of a class whose elements are “regularly” composed out of some subset of primitives.

In what follows, the concept of struct introduced in Def. 3 will sometimes be referred to as that of *level 0 struct*, since we are about to embark on the construction of structs of *various levels*.

To proceed to the definition of a single level class representation, we need to introduce the following two concepts, upon which the former relies. They properly belong to Part II but are placed here for convenience of reference, since the central definition of this section relies heavily on them. The first definition suggests one approach to the specification of a family of structs sharing some structural “components”. We propose to use such structural specifications to describe *restrictions* for a single step in a systematic process for generating a set of “similar” structs.

**Definition 9.** A (structural, level 0) **constraint**  $\text{Con}(\Pi_1, \text{SL})$ , or simply  $\text{Con}(\Pi_1)$ , involving a set of primitives  $\Pi_1$ ,  $\Pi_1 \subseteq \Pi$ , is a pair<sup>31</sup>

$$\text{Con}(\Pi_1) = \langle \Pi_\alpha, \text{SL} \rangle$$

satisfying the following condition: there exists struct  $\alpha$ ,  $\alpha = \langle \Pi_1, \text{SL}_\alpha \rangle$ , and its relabeling  $f$ , such that  $\Pi_{\alpha\{f\}} = \Pi_1$  and  $\text{SL} \subseteq \text{SL}_{\alpha\{f\}}$ . We say that the latter **struct**  $\alpha$  **satisfies constraint**  $\text{Con}(\Pi_1)$ , see Fig. 23. ▶

As is customary in mathematics, one can introduce the concept of the *strength* of a constraint. In our case, it is directly related to the cardinality of  $\text{SL}$ : for a fixed  $\Pi_1$ , a stronger constraint will have a larger  $\text{SL}$ . However, we will not use the concept of strength in this paper.

The above is the simplest form of the constraint specification. What are more refined versions of the above definition? A generalization that appears quite natural to us is one requiring, in the above definition, a partitioning of  $\Pi_1$  into two sets:  $\Pi_{\text{upper}}$  and  $\Pi_{\text{lower}}$ . In this case,  $\Pi_{\text{upper}}$  is supposed to mark that part of a struct (in the corresponding family) that plays the role of a “structural interface”, i.e. the minimal overlapping set of primitives that is shared with a temporally *preceding* struct. This set could also be thought of as specifying

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<sup>31</sup> Although this pair “looks” similar to the pair associated with a struct, these two concepts are different.




Figure 17: A structural constraint with  $\Pi_1 = \{\pi_{1a}, \pi_{2f}, \pi_{3k}, \pi_{4p}\}$ , and two sets of struts, where the top struts satisfy the constraint, while the bottom ones do not. Struts  $\alpha_4$  and  $\alpha_5$  are missing one of the links specified in the constraint, and strut  $\alpha_6$  is missing a specified primitive.

the (minimal) *context part* of a constraint. The subset  $\Pi_{\text{lower}}$  plays a similar role, but with respect to temporally *subsequent* struts.

The next definition *restricts* the above family of struts, satisfying constraint  $\text{Con}(\Pi_1)$ , to a particular subfamily of struts.

**Definition 10.** For a strut  $\sigma$  and constraint  $\text{Con}(\Pi_1)$ , the set  $\text{Rcont}(\sigma, \text{Con}(\Pi_1))$  of **restricted continuations** of  $\sigma$  is defined as the set of all struts  $\alpha$  satisfying the following conditions (see Fig. 18):

- (i)  $\alpha$  satisfies  $\text{Con}(\Pi_1)$
- (ii) assembly  $\mathcal{A}(\sigma, \alpha)$  exists
- (iii)  $\alpha$  and  $\sigma$  share at least one primitive
- (iv)  $\alpha$  has at least one primitive which is not present in  $\sigma$ .

In this case, the resulting assembly  $\mathcal{A}(\sigma, \alpha)$  is also denoted  $\sigma \triangleleft_{\text{Con}(\Pi_1)} \alpha$ . ▶

The last two conditions ensure that  $\alpha$  and  $\sigma$  overlap and that  $\alpha$  is not a substruct of  $\sigma$ .




Figure 18: Struct  $\alpha$  satisfying the constraint given in Fig. 23 and applicable to struct  $\sigma$ , and the result of application of  $\alpha$  to  $\sigma$ .

We are now ready to introduce the central concept of this section.

**Definition 11.** A **single-level (class) representation**  $\mathfrak{R}$  is a pair

$$\mathfrak{R} = \langle \mathbf{\Pi}_{\mathfrak{R}}, \mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}} \rangle,$$

where  $\mathbf{\Pi}_{\mathfrak{R}}, \mathbf{\Pi}_{\mathfrak{R}} \subseteq \mathbf{\Pi}$ , is a set of **constituent abstract primitives** (for the class), and  $\mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}$  is a (partial) specification of a **(level 0) class generating system**:

$$\mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}} = \left\langle \left\{ \text{Con}_{1,i}(\Pi_{1,i}) \right\}_{i \in I_1}, \left\{ \text{Con}_{2,i}(\Pi_{2,i}) \right\}_{i \in I_2}, \dots, \left\{ \text{Con}_{t,i}(\Pi_{t,i}) \right\}_{i \in I_t} \right\rangle,$$

where each  $\pi \in \Pi_{j,i}$  is taken from some  $\pi$ ,  $\pi \in \Pi_{\mathfrak{R}}$ . The *actions* of this generating system are described next.

Each step in the operation of the generating system  $\mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}$  follows a step in the action of the **level 0 environment**  $\mathfrak{E}$ , which could be thought of as a finite set of level 0 classes that can immediately interact with the above class, each specified by its own sets of primitives and constraints. Specifically, at step  $j$ , the system “responds” to the following  $j^{\text{th}}$  step by  $\mathfrak{E}$  in a manner specified below:

- the environment  $\mathfrak{E}$  may assemble several structs (each taken from a corresponding class) to the **working struct**  $\sigma_{2j}$  to produce the next working struct  $\sigma_{2j+1}$ ;
- in turn<sup>32</sup>, the class generating system first nondeterministically/probabilistically chooses struct  $\beta_j$  from the set of structs  $\bigcup_{i \in I_j} \text{Rcont}(\sigma_{2j+1}, \text{Con}_{j,i}(\Pi_{j,i}))$ , and then adds/assembles  $\beta_j$  to  $\sigma_{2j+1}$  to produce the next working struct  $\sigma_{2j+2}$  (see Fig. 19).

The generating system  $\mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}$  contains its own terminating condition and satisfies the following global restriction: the assembly  $\gamma = \mathcal{A}(\beta_1, \beta_2, \dots, \beta_s)$ ,  $\gamma \in \sigma_{\text{final}}$ , involving all  $\beta_j$ 's, must exist. For any such (nondeterministically constructed by  $\mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}$ ) struct  $\gamma$ , the pair

$$\mathfrak{c} = \langle \gamma, \mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}} \rangle$$

is called a (level 0) **class element** of the **single-level class**  $\mathfrak{C}(\mathfrak{R}, \mathfrak{E})$ —or simply  $\mathfrak{C}$ —**associated with, or induced by,  $\mathfrak{R}$  in environment  $\mathfrak{E}$**  (see Fig. 20). ▶

The adjective “partial” qualifying the specification of a level 0 class generating system (in the first paragraph of the definition), is supposed to suggest that this specification is, in a sense, incomplete: not only is the terminating condition implicit, but the above “actions” of the system are also not integrated into its specification.

We draw your attention to the fact that the class representation  $\mathfrak{R}$ —in contrast to its output, i.e. the associated class  $\mathfrak{C}$ —is independent<sup>33</sup> of the environment  $\mathfrak{E}$ .

Moreover,  $\mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}$  can be thought of as being a semi-autonomous system “responsible for producing” class elements. Also note that, when a generating system goes into a termination mode, it does not necessarily mean that the corresponding output process is fully “terminated”, but possibly that another (closely related) generating system takes over, e.g. a fetus versus a newborn infant.

An important difference between the ETS formalism and other formalisms (e.g. generative grammar models) is that *ETS is structured in such a way* as to allow for an (inductive) “bridging” of the two components of the above  $\mathfrak{c}$ . In other words, it is expected that the temporal information embodied in the first component (the struct) allows for a *reliable* recovery of the second component, based on a small training set of structs.

Recalling our assumption about the disjointness of primal classes (before Def. 1), indeed any two classes are disjoint, since each class element carries within itself its class representation. A fundamental pragmatic implication of this is that the stored form of every class

<sup>32</sup> The class generating system acts without reference to the structure of  $\mathfrak{E}$ , i.e. it does not know the structure of the classes that affected the working struct.

<sup>33</sup> Or, more accurately, *acts* independently.




Figure 19: Pictorial representation of two steps—a step by the environment  $\mathfrak{E}$  and the corresponding step by the class generating system  $\mathfrak{G}_R$ —in the construction of class element  $c$ ,  $c \in \mathfrak{C}$ . Shaded primitives are those added by the environment.

element *must include the corresponding class representation*, though this is not necessarily accessible to an external agent.

As to the importance of the role of the environment, it suffices to quote one of the leading developmental biologists, Scott Gilbert [68, p. 721]:

[R]ecent studies have shown that the environmental context plays significant roles in the development of almost all species, and that animal and plant genomes have evolved to respond to environmental conditions. . . . Moreover, symbiotic associations, wherein the genes of one organism are regulated by the products of another organism, appear to be rule, rather than the exception.

How tentative is the above generating system specification? At present, one should approach that issue with due caution, in view of the lack of relevant experience. The main difficulty in addressing this issue is related to the lack of a precise language for describing such a generative mechanism in the structural setting outlined above. However, it appears that




Figure 20: Left: Pictorial representation of the final output of the class generating system, the working struct  $\sigma_{\text{final}}$  (which is a “completion” of the last struct shown in Fig. 19). Right: The corresponding substruct  $\gamma$  of struct  $\sigma_{\text{final}}$ , where  $\gamma$  is the struct in the class element  $\mathbf{c}$ ,  $\mathbf{c} = \langle \gamma, \mathcal{S}_{\mathfrak{R}} \rangle$ . On the far right, we show a depiction of a contracted  $\mathbf{c}$  as a (potential) component of a level 1 struct (Def. 13), a depiction which will be used the sequel: solid dots stand for contracted primitives.

a hint in this direction may lie in the appropriate generalization of the structural constraint concept introduced in Def. 9.

**Important Remark 2.** For a fixed level 0 class setting, each class generating system has a range of “states”, having passed though which the system always remains in a mature state (and continues to produce mature class elements). Having passed this range of states, the struct  $\gamma$  within class element  $\mathbf{c}$  is supposed to carry almost all structural information associated with the class. Moreover, some class elements are “continuations” of other class elements—some immature, some mature—and one branch of the class generating system responsible for producing a complete (temporal) chain of class elements may be called a **class system instance**. In the Introduction (and also throughout the paper), when we speak of “structural processes”, it is the latter concept that comes closest to describing such processes. Hence, it is quite reasonable to expect that, in the future, a class element will become a more dynamic entity, capturing the idea of a (concrete) structural process.

For an organism, one can view its embryonic stage as corresponding to an immature state

of the class generating process. The adult stage of an organism corresponds to the mature part of a class system instance, i.e. when the organism/process becomes ready for interaction (with other processes). ►

**Definition 12.** We introduce a finite set of single-level classes

$$\mathcal{C} = \{ \mathfrak{C}_1, \mathfrak{C}_2, \dots, \mathfrak{C}_{l_0} \},$$

$l_0$  is the number of single-level classes, which we call a **level 0 class setting**. ►

The next definition introduces the concept of level 1 struct, as being assembled from several level 0 class elements.

**Definition 13.** Having fixed class setting  $\mathcal{C}$ , a **level 1 struct**  $\sigma^1$  is defined as a pair

$$\sigma^1 = \langle \mathcal{C}_\sigma, \sigma \rangle,$$

where the **level 0 class-based representation of level 0 struct**  $\sigma$

$$\mathcal{C}_\sigma = \{ \mathfrak{c}_1, \mathfrak{c}_2, \dots, \mathfrak{c}_{s_0} \}$$

is defined in such a way that  $\mathfrak{c}_i \in \mathfrak{C}_j$ ,  $\mathfrak{c}_i = \langle \gamma_i, \mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{X}_i} \rangle$ , and  $\sigma = \mathcal{A}(\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \dots, \gamma_{s_0})$ . We refer to  $\mathfrak{c}_i$  as a **constituent element of**  $\sigma^1$ . See Figure 21.

An **overlap graph** for level 1 struct  $\sigma^1$  is a graph whose vertices are the above structs  $\gamma_i$ 's with an edge between a pair of them present if the corresponding two structs overlap, i.e. they share (concrete) primitives.

The set of all level 1 structs will be denoted  $\Sigma^1$ , and when  $\mathcal{C}_\sigma = \emptyset$ , struct  $\sigma^1$  will be called the **null level 1 struct**, denoted  $\theta^1$ . ►

We now generalize the concept of substruct to level 1 structs.

**Definition 14.** For two level 1 structs  $\alpha^1 = \langle \mathcal{C}_\alpha, \alpha \rangle$  and  $\beta^1 = \langle \mathcal{C}_\beta, \beta \rangle$ , we say that  $\alpha^1$  is a **substruct** of  $\beta^1$ , denoted<sup>34</sup>  $\alpha^1 \in \beta^1$ , if

$$\mathcal{C}_\alpha \subseteq \mathcal{C}_\beta.$$

►

Next, we generalize the concept of struct assembly to level 1 structs.

**Definition 15.** Given several level 1 structs  $\sigma_1^1, \sigma_2^1, \dots, \sigma_r^1$ , where  $\sigma_i^1 = \langle \mathcal{C}_{\sigma_i}, \sigma_i \rangle$ , if the assembly  $\mathcal{A}(\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots, \sigma_r)$  is a valid struct  $\sigma$  then the pair

$$\sigma^1 = \left\langle \bigcup_{i=1}^r \mathcal{C}_{\sigma_i}, \sigma \right\rangle$$

is a level 1 struct called the **assembly of level 1 structs**  $\sigma_1^1, \sigma_2^1, \dots, \sigma_r^1$  and is denoted

$$\sigma^1 = \mathcal{A}(\sigma_1^1, \sigma_2^1, \dots, \sigma_r^1).$$

►

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<sup>34</sup> For simplicity, we suppress the level index on the substruct operator  $\in^1$  since both operands carry the corresponding index and thus no ambiguity arises.




Figure 21: Simplified pictorial representation of a level 1 struct (in the contracted form given in Fig. 20).

## 6 Two-level class representations

In this section, we make the next step towards a generalization of the concept of class and introduce the concept of two-level class representation, in which the concept of overlap graph plays the role of attachment graph.

We will need the following notation for a finite set whose elements are elements of various (not necessarily different) classes from level 0 class setting  $\mathcal{C}$ :

$$\mathcal{C} = \{ \mathbf{c}_i \mid \mathbf{c}_i \in \mathfrak{C}_{k_i} \in \mathcal{C} \}.$$

**Definition 16.** For a level 0 class setting  $\mathcal{C}$ , a **level 1 class element link**,  $\text{CEL}^1(\mathcal{C}, \text{Con}(\Pi_1))$ , between (level 0 class) elements in a set  $\mathcal{C}$  is defined as the pair

$$\text{CEL}^1(\mathcal{C}, \text{Con}(\Pi_1)) = \langle \mathcal{C}, \text{Con}(\Pi_1) \rangle,$$

where  $\forall \mathbf{c}_i \in \mathcal{C}$ ,  $\mathbf{c}_i = \langle \gamma_i, \mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{A}_i} \rangle$ ,  $\exists \gamma_i^*$ ,  $\gamma_i^* = \langle \Pi_1, \text{SL}_i^* \rangle$ , such that:

- (i) assembly  $\sigma = \mathcal{A}(\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \dots, \gamma_r)$  exists
- (ii)  $\gamma_i^* \in \gamma_i$
- (iii)  $\gamma_i^*$  satisfies  $\text{Con}(\Pi_1)$ .

See also Figure 22. ▶

In other words, the above elements  $\mathbf{c}_i$  share the same structural “components” (“link”). Note that the shaded region in Fig. 22 is an assembly of the  $\gamma_i^*$ ’s and (always) satisfies  $\text{Con}(\Pi_1)$ .




Figure 22: Illustration of a level 1 class element link. Left: structs corresponding to three level 0 class elements (forming  $\mathcal{C}$ ) with the corresponding substructs satisfying constraint  $\text{Con}(\Pi_1)$  delineated with dotted lines. Right: the corresponding struct  $\sigma$  formed by the latter structs.

**Definition 17.** For a level 0 class setting  $\mathcal{C}$ , a (structural) **level 1 constraint**  $\text{Con}^1(\mathcal{C})$  involving a finite set  $\mathcal{C}$  of class elements is defined as a pair

$$\text{Con}^1(\mathcal{C}) = \left\langle \mathcal{C}, \left\{ \text{CEL}^1(\mathcal{C}_j, \text{Con}(\Pi_j)) \right\}_{1 \leq j \leq J} \right\rangle,$$

where  $\mathcal{C}_j \subseteq \mathcal{C}$  and the following condition is satisfied:

there exists level 1 struct

$$\sigma^1 = \langle \mathcal{C}_\sigma, \sigma \rangle$$

and bijection

$$g: \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}_\sigma$$

such that

$$\forall \mathbf{c}_i \in \mathcal{C}, \mathbf{c}_i \in \mathfrak{C}_{k_i} \implies g(\mathbf{c}_i) \in \mathfrak{C}_{k_i},$$

and  $\forall j$   $\text{CEL}^1(g(\mathcal{C}_j), \text{Con}(\Pi_j))$  is a level 1 class element link.

In the latter case, we say that the level 1 **struct**  $\sigma^1$  **satisfies constraint**  $\text{Con}^1(\mathcal{C})$ .  $\blacktriangleright$

As can be seen from Fig. 23, it is *convenient* (although incomplete) to think of a level 1 constraint as a combination of previous-level constraints.

Analogous to Def. 10, the next definition *restricts* the above family of level 1 structs, satisfying constraint  $\text{Con}^1(\mathcal{C})$ , to a particular subfamily of level 1 structs.




Figure 23: Pictorial illustration of a level 1 struct  $\sigma^1$  which satisfies constraint  $\text{Con}^1(\mathcal{C})$ .

**Definition 18.** For a level 1 struct  $\sigma^1$  and constraint  $\text{Con}^1(\mathcal{C})$ , the set  $\text{Rcont}(\sigma^1, \text{Con}^1(\mathcal{C}))$  of **restricted continuations** of  $\sigma^1$  is defined as the set of all level 1 structs  $\alpha^1$  satisfying the following conditions:

- (i)  $\alpha^1$  satisfies  $\text{Con}^1(\mathcal{C})$
- (ii) level 1 assembly  $\mathcal{A}(\sigma^1, \alpha^1)$  exists
- (iii)  $\alpha^1$  and  $\sigma^1$  share at least one constituent element
- (iv)  $\alpha^1$  has at least one constituent element which is not present in  $\sigma^1$ .

In this case, the resulting level 1 assembly  $\mathcal{A}(\sigma^1, \alpha^1)$  is also denoted  $\sigma^1 \triangleleft_{\text{Con}^1(\mathcal{C})} \alpha^1$ . ▶

Again, the last two conditions ensure that  $\alpha^1$  and  $\sigma^1$  overlap and that neither is a substruct of the other.

We now proceed to the definition of a two-level class representation.

**Definition 19.** A two-level (class) representation  $\mathfrak{R}^1$  is a pair

$$\mathfrak{R}^1 = \langle \mathcal{C}_{\mathfrak{R}}, \mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}^1 \rangle,$$

where  $\mathcal{C}_{\mathfrak{R}}, \mathcal{C}_{\mathfrak{R}} \subseteq \mathcal{C}$ , is a set of **constituent level 0 classes**, and  $\mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}^1$  is a (partial) specification of a **level 1 class generating system**:

$$\mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}^1 = \left\langle \left\{ \text{Con}_{1,i}^1(\mathcal{C}_{1,i}) \right\}_{i \in I_1^1}, \left\{ \text{Con}_{2,i}^1(\mathcal{C}_{2,i}) \right\}_{i \in I_2^1}, \dots \right\rangle,$$

where each  $\mathfrak{c} \in \mathcal{C}_{j,i}$ ,  $\mathfrak{c} \in \mathfrak{C}_k \in \mathcal{C}_{\mathfrak{R}}$ . The *actions* of this generating system are described next.

Each step in the operation of the generating system  $\mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}^1$  follows a step in the action of the **level 1 environment**  $\mathfrak{E}^1$ , which could be thought of as a finite set of level 1 classes that can immediately interact with the above class, each specified by its own set of constraints. Specifically, at step  $j$ , the system “responds” to the following  $j^{\text{th}}$  step by  $\mathfrak{E}^1$  in a manner specified below:

- the environment  $\mathfrak{E}^1$  may assemble several level 1 structs (each taken from a corresponding class) to the **level 1 working struct**  $\sigma_{2j}^1$  to produce the next level 1 working struct  $\sigma_{2j+1}^1$ ;
- in turn, the class generating system first nondeterministically chooses level 1 struct  $\beta_j^1$  from the set of level 1 structs  $\bigcup_{i \in I_j^1} \text{Rcont}(\sigma_{2j+1}^1, \text{Con}_{j,i}^1(\mathcal{C}_{j,i}))$ , and then adds/assembles  $\beta_j^1$  to  $\sigma_{2j+1}^1$  to produce the next level 1 working struct  $\sigma_{2j+2}^1$  (see Fig. 24).


The generating system  $\mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}^1$  contains its own terminating condition and satisfies the following global restriction: the (level 1) assembly  $\gamma^1 = \mathcal{A}(\beta_1^1, \beta_2^1, \dots)$ , involving all  $\beta_j^1$ 's, must exist. For any such (nondeterministically constructed by  $\mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}^1$ ) level 1 struct  $\gamma^1$ , the pair

$$\mathfrak{c}^1 = \langle \gamma^1, \mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}^1 \rangle$$

is called a (level 1) **class element** of the **two-level class**  $\mathfrak{C}(\mathfrak{R}^1, \mathfrak{E}^1)$  **associated with, or induced by,  $\mathfrak{R}^1$  in environment  $\mathfrak{E}^1$**  (see Fig. 25). When no confusion arises, this class is also denoted  $\mathfrak{C}^1$ . ▶

It is important to note that the generating system is outputs not only ideal class elements but also so-called “noisy” ones, i.e. it should be able to produce class elements of appropriate (for that class and its environment) structural variability, some simply being more typical than others. On the other hand, there are some environments which modify classes in such a way that the *class’s representation changes*. The relevant ETS mechanism—a transformation—that addresses such changes of class representations (as well as the production of new classes) will be considered in Section 8.

As was done in the previous section for level 0 classes, we are now ready to define a class setting for level 1.



Current working struct  
before the  $j^{\text{th}}$  step by  $\mathfrak{E}^1$

The working struct after  
the  $j^{\text{th}}$  step by  $\mathfrak{E}^1$

The working struct after the  $j^{\text{th}}$   
step by the class generating system

Figure 24: Pictorial representation of two steps—a step by the environment  $\mathfrak{E}^1$  and the corresponding step by the class generating system  $\mathcal{G}_{S^1}^1$ —in the construction of class element  $c^1$ ,  $c^1 \in \mathfrak{C}^1$ . Dots stand for primitives, and lines delineate level 1 class elements. Grey structs are those added by the environment.

**Definition 20.** We introduce a finite set of two-level classes

$$\mathfrak{C}^1 = \{ \mathfrak{c}_1^1, \mathfrak{c}_2^1, \dots, \mathfrak{c}_{l_1}^1 \},$$

$l_1$  is the number of two-level classes, which we treat as a **level 1 class setting**. ▶

The evolution of the Universe suggests that the following inequalities between the corresponding cardinalities emerge with time:

$$m < l_0 < l_1.$$

Indeed, these inequalities are quite natural since, for example, the number of classes is much larger than the number of primitives.

Level 2 analogues of Definitions 13–15 (including **level 2 struct**, **substruct**, and **assembly of level 2 structs**) follow immediately. For convenience, we present an analogue of Definition 13 only.




Figure 25: Left: Pictorial representation of the final output of the class generating system, the level 1 working struct  $\sigma_{\text{final}}^1$  (which is a “completion” of the last struct shown in Fig. 24). Right: The corresponding level 1 substruct  $\gamma^1$  of struct  $\sigma_{\text{final}}^1$ , where  $\gamma^1$  is the struct in the class element  $\mathbf{c}^1$ ,  $\mathbf{c}^1 = \langle \gamma^1, \mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}^1 \rangle$ . On the far right, we show a depiction of  $\mathbf{c}^1$  as a (potential) component of a level 2 struct (Def. 21).

**Definition 21.** Having fixed class setting  $\mathcal{C}^1$ , a **level 2 struct**  $\sigma^2$  is defined as a pair

$$\sigma^2 = \langle \mathcal{C}_{\sigma^1}^1, \sigma^1 \rangle,$$

where the **level 1 class-based representation of level 1 struct**  $\sigma^1$

$$\mathcal{C}_{\sigma^1}^1 = \{ \mathbf{c}_1^1, \mathbf{c}_2^1, \dots, \mathbf{c}_{s_1}^1 \}$$

is defined in such a way that  $\mathbf{c}_i^1 \in \mathcal{C}_j^1$ ,  $\mathbf{c}_i^1 = \langle \gamma_i^1, \mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}_i}^1 \rangle$ , and  $\sigma^1 = \mathcal{A}(\gamma_1^1, \gamma_2^1, \dots, \gamma_{s_1}^1)$ .

An **overlap graph** for level 2 struct  $\sigma^2$  is a graph whose vertices are the above class elements  $\gamma_i^1$ 's with an edge between a pair of them present if the corresponding two struct overlap, i.e. they share constituent level 1 class elements.

The set of all level 2 structs will be denoted  $\Sigma^2$ , and when  $\mathcal{C}_{\sigma^1}^1 = \emptyset$ , struct  $\sigma^2$  will be called the **null level 2 struct**, denoted  $\theta^2$ . ▶

In Figures 26–29, we present a simplified illustration of an (artificial) level 2 class whose generating system relies on three level 1 classes, C1, C2, and C3. The simplification relates to the specification of the generating systems involved: *for each class, all of its constraints are “admissible” at each step.* We chose a form of constraint involving context: the context of the constraint must be present in the working struct in order for a struct satisfying the constraint to be applicable, and when applying such a struct to the working struct, the context is the minimum structure that they must share. Finally, also for simplicity, *the effects of the environment have not been considered*, i.e. no environmental classes participate in the generating process.

**Important Remark 3.** We draw the reader’s attention to the following incompleteness in our presentation: we have not yet *finalized* the generalization of the concept of primitive attachment (and therefore the relation SL) to class elements in a higher-level struct in such a way that would describe the interrelationships between the various constituent class elements. ▀

## 7 Higher-level class representations

Finally, we are going to discuss the general form of class representation, which is a straightforward adaptation of a two-level class representation. To avoid a bacchanalia of level-related indices in the class representation for a general level  $k$ —which is *absolutely* analogous to the one presented below and in Def. 19—it is sufficient to restate the level 1/2 definitions for level 2/3 (particularly in view of the fact that the number of levels is always expected to be very small).

We proceed to the definition of a three-level class representation, where analogues of Defs. 16, 17, and 18 are omitted (since they are trivial modifications of the latter definitions). The corresponding notations are:  $\text{CEL}^2(\mathcal{C}^1, \text{Con}^2(\mathcal{C}))$ ,  $\text{Con}^2(\mathcal{C}^1)$ , and  $\text{Rcont}(\sigma^2, \text{Con}^2(\mathcal{C}^1))$ .

**Definition 22.** A three-level (class) representation  $\mathfrak{R}^2$  is a pair

$$\mathfrak{R}^2 = \langle \mathcal{C}_{\mathfrak{R}}^1, \mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}^2 \rangle,$$

where  $\mathcal{C}_{\mathfrak{R}}^1, \mathcal{C}_{\mathfrak{R}}^1 \subseteq \mathcal{C}^1$ , is a set of **constituent level 1 classes**, and  $\mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}^2$  is a (partial) specification of a **level 2 class generating system**:

$$\mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}^2 = \left\langle \left\{ \text{Con}_{1,i}^2(\mathcal{C}_{1,i}^1) \right\}_{i \in I_1^2}, \left\{ \text{Con}_{2,i}^2(\mathcal{C}_{2,i}^1) \right\}_{i \in I_2^2}, \dots \right\rangle,$$

where each  $\mathbf{c}^1 \in \mathcal{C}_{j,i}^1$ ,  $\mathbf{c}^1 \in \mathfrak{C}_k^1 \in \mathcal{C}_{\mathfrak{R}}^1$ . The *actions* of this generating system are described next.

Each step in the operation of the generating system  $\mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}^2$  follows a step in the action of the **level 2 environment**  $\mathfrak{E}^2$ , which could be thought of as a finite set of level 2 classes that can immediately interact with the above class, each specified by its own set of constraints. Specifically, at step  $j$ , the system “responds” to the following  $j^{\text{th}}$  step by  $\mathfrak{E}^2$  in a manner specified below:




Figure 26: Level 0 class  $\mathbf{C1}$ : (a) A “tail” substruct which must be present in the initial working struct before the generating system can act, i.e. all initial structs must “end” with this tail. (b) Three (generalized) constraints for this class; the part of each constraint above the dashed line should be thought of as the “context” part of that constraint. (The depiction of each constraint shows all concrete primitives for that constraint, though their labels are suppressed for simplicity. It is easy to see that there exists exactly one struct satisfying each constraint.) (c) Five structs from  $\mathbf{C1}$ , where, for example,  $\mathbf{c1}_2$  is constructed by applying constraint  $\text{Con}_1^{\mathbf{C1}}$  in step 1 and constraint  $\text{Con}_3^{\mathbf{C1}}$  in step 2.




Figure 27: Level 0 class  $\mathbf{C2}$ : (a) A "tail" substruct which must be present in the initial working struct before the generating system can act. (b) Four (generalized) constraints for this class. (Again, there exists exactly one struct satisfying each constraint.) (c) Five struts from  $\mathbf{C2}$ , where, for example,  $\mathbf{c2}_2$  is constructed by applying constraint  $\text{Con}_3^{\mathbf{C2}}$  in step 1, constraint  $\text{Con}_2^{\mathbf{C2}}$  in step 2, and constraint  $\text{Con}_4^{\mathbf{C1}}$  in step 3.




Figure 28: Level 0 class  $C3$ : (a) A “tail” substructure which must be present in the initial working struct before the generating system can act. (b) Three (generalized) constraints for this class. (Note that there are three structs satisfying the first constraint, two satisfying the second, and only one satisfying the third.) (c) Five structs from  $C3$ , where, for example,  $c3_5$  is constructed by applying constraints  $Con_2^{C3}$ ,  $Con_1^{C3}$ ,  $Con_3^{C3}$ , and  $Con_1^{C3}$  at consecutive steps.




Figure 29: Schematic representation of the level 1 struct for some element  $c^1$  from the level 1 class  $\mathcal{C}^1$  with its constituent elements delineated with ellipses. One way element  $c^1$  could have been constructed is given by the following four steps: in the first step, the level 1 struct composed of a single element  $c2_6$  was chosen; in the next step, the level 1 struct composed of elements  $c3_2$  and  $c1_2$  was added; then, the level 1 struct composed of elements  $c3_5$ ,  $c1_1$ , and  $c1_3$  was added; and finally, the level 1 struct composed of element  $c1_4$  was added. Note that the depiction adopted in Fig. 24 is not used here, to show more fully the “backbone” element ( $c2_6$ ) for this  $c^1$ .

- the environment  $\mathfrak{E}^2$  may assemble several level 2 structs (each taken from a corresponding class) to the **level 2 working struct**  $\sigma_{2j}^2$  to produce the next level 2 working struct  $\sigma_{2j+1}^2$ ;
- in turn, the class generating system first nondeterministically chooses level 2 struct  $\beta_j^2$  from the set of level 2 structs  $\bigcup_{i \in I_j^2} \text{Rcont}(\sigma_{2j+1}^2, \text{Con}_{j,i}^2(\mathcal{C}_{j,i}^1))$ , and then adds/assembles  $\beta_j^2$  to  $\sigma_{2j+1}^2$  to produce the next level 2 working struct  $\sigma_{2j+2}^2$ .

The generating system  $\mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}^2$  contains its own terminating condition and satisfies the following global restriction: the (level 2) assembly  $\gamma^2 = \mathcal{A}(\beta_1^2, \beta_2^2, \dots)$ , involving all  $\beta_j^2$ 's, must exist. For any such (nondeterministically constructed by  $\mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}^2$ ) level 2 struct  $\gamma^2$ , the pair

$$\mathfrak{c}^2 = \langle \gamma^2, \mathcal{G}_{\mathfrak{R}}^2 \rangle$$

is called a (level 2) **class element** of the **three-level class**  $\mathfrak{C}(\mathfrak{R}^2, \mathfrak{E}^2)$  **associated with, or induced by,  $\mathfrak{R}^2$  in environment  $\mathfrak{E}^2$** . When no confusion arises, this class is also denoted  $\mathfrak{C}^2$ . ▶

Obviously, for some chosen application, for a particular level, the effect of the environment on a class may manifest itself to a “larger or lesser extent” as compared to that on a class at a different level, i.e. at a particular level, there may either be more or less environmental classes interacting with the class in question.

Next, level 2 analogues of **level 2 class setting** and  $\mathfrak{C}_i^2$  **w.r.t.  $\mathcal{C}^2$** , and level 3 analogues of **level 3 struct**, its **substruct**, and **assembly of level 3 structs**, follow immediately.

**Speculative remark.** One of the anticipated consequences of the above class representation definition is that it should facilitate the introduction of an analogue of the concept of a *topology* for a class (i.e. how “close”) and also facilitates the emergence of a “class topography” (i.e. how “typical”). Moreover, it is natural to assume that a fixed set of classes (at all previous levels) do not uniquely induce the topology of a next-level class: it is the overall structure, or “structural features”, of the generating system that should ensure uniqueness. ▸

For a very early attempt to implement the concept of structural generativity via Markov stochastic processes in the ETS formalism, see [3], [42], [43] (where this was accomplished in a more conventional manner by attaching numeric weights to transforms).

## Part IV

# Transformations and stages

Our understanding of the world is built up of innumerable layers. Each layer is worth exploring, as long as we do not forget that it is one of many. Knowing all there is to know about one layer—a most unlikely event—would not teach us much about the rest.

E. Chargaff, *Heraclitean Fire: Sketches from a Life before Nature*, 1978

## 8 Transformations

In this section, we introduce several additional central concepts, i.e. those of abstract and concrete transformations, which, in particular, are supposed to clarify those of abstract and concrete primitives. As was mentioned in the Introduction, by a ‘transformation’ we mean a macroevent that encapsulates the metamorphosis of one set of interacting structural processes into another set of processes. This macroevent signals the disruption of the previously stable flow of events associated with the corresponding structural processes, due to *new*, “disruptive” interactions of the latter processes, i.e. those not *already* a part of their regular flows. Thus, a transformation entrenches the nature of a particular (and possibly recurring) *pattern of interactions for the ‘initial’ structural processes which results in modified ‘terminal’ structural processes*: we say that the result of the interaction of the initial class generating systems is a set of terminal class generating systems. An abstract transform, then, can be viewed as an apparatus responsible for generating/modifying classes out of existing ones. In view of the unresolved complexity of the transform concept, the exposition in this section is more sketchy.

It might be useful to note that the concept of a transformation can also be considered as a far-reaching generalization of the concept of an element of an (algebraic) transformation group, where such an element is supposed to represent one of the transformations preserving object invariance, and the whole transformation group is supposed to capture the various symmetries of the object.

**Definition 23.** In what follows we assume that, at this (**basic or 0<sup>th</sup>**) **stage of representation**, we have constructed classes of up to level  $r$ , culminating in the following (**basic stage class setting**)

$$\mathcal{C} = \bigcup_{i=1}^r \mathcal{C}^i.$$

We set  $m' = |\mathcal{C}|$  and, for simplicity, when referring to a class  $\mathcal{C}_j^i$  from  $\mathcal{C}$ , we will drop its level index  $i$  (keeping in mind that classes, their elements, etc. have implicit indices referring to levels). ▶

Before introducing transformations, we need the following notations.

**Notational convention 3.** A  $p$ -tuple of classes selected from  $\mathcal{C}$

$$\langle \mathfrak{C}_{i_1}, \mathfrak{C}_{i_2}, \dots, \mathfrak{C}_{i_p} \rangle$$

is called a **tuple of classes** (TC). Moreover, a  $p$ -tuple

$$\langle \mathfrak{c}_{i_1}, \mathfrak{c}_{i_2}, \dots, \mathfrak{c}_{i_p} \rangle,$$

such that

$$\mathfrak{c}_{i_j} \in \mathfrak{C}_{i_j} \quad \text{and} \quad \mathfrak{c}_{i_j} \neq \mathfrak{c}_{i_k} \quad \text{for } j \neq k,$$

is called a **tuple of class elements** (TCE) associated with TC.

We will need to distinguish between *two kinds of tuples* of classes, which we refer to as an **initial tuple of classes** (ITC) and **terminal tuple of classes** (TTC), and the corresponding tuples of class elements (referred to as ITCE and TTCE, respectively).

Given a TC, the corresponding **set of all tuples of class elements** is denoted  $\mathbf{TCE}_{\text{TC}}$ ,  $\mathbf{TCE}_{\text{TC}} \subseteq \mathfrak{C}_{i_1} \times \dots \times \mathfrak{C}_{i_p}$ . ▮

Moving on to the central definition in this section and relying on the terminology of Notational Convention 3, we note that the following concept of a transformation in fact *designates* a particular kind of interaction<sup>35</sup> *between* the constituent processes of ITC, resulting in the generation of the terminal tuple of processes TTC.

**Definition 24.** For a given **abstract transformation name**  $\hat{\tau}$ , the corresponding **abstract transformation** of classes (from  $\mathcal{C}$ ), or simply **abstract transform**, is an enumerable set  $\tau$ <sup>36</sup>

$$\tau = \left\{ \tau(\text{ITCE}) \mid \text{ITCE} \in \mathbf{TCE}_{\text{ITC}(\hat{\tau})} \right\}$$

whose generic element  $\tau(\text{ITCE})$ , called a *corresponding* (concrete) **transform**, is defined as follows:<sup>37</sup>

for each ITCE from  $\mathbf{TCE}_{\text{ITC}(\hat{\tau})}$  the corresponding transform is defined as<sup>38</sup>

$$\tau(\text{ITCE}) = \tau_{\text{ITCE}} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle \hat{\tau}, \text{ITC}(\hat{\tau}), \text{TTC}(\hat{\tau}), \text{ITCE} \rangle,$$

where

<sup>35</sup> At present, given our limited applied experience, we do not propose any classification of these interactions (into concrete categories).

<sup>36</sup> Note that, here, the set  $\mathbf{TCE}_{\text{ITC}(\tau)}$  plays a role analogous to that of the set of labels  $\mathcal{L}$  associated with a primitive  $\pi$  (see Def. 1). The latter important analogy will be exploited in the next section, when transforms are replaced by next-level primitives (see mapping *tabst* <sub>$i$ -labl</sub> in Def. 26).

<sup>37</sup> As in Def. 1, both of the following notations, i.e.  $\tau(\text{ITCE})$  and  $\tau_{\text{ITCE}}$ , will be used.

<sup>38</sup> For simplicity, the hat accent on  $\hat{\tau}$  is dropped when it is used as a lower index.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ITC}(\widehat{\tau}) &= \langle \mathfrak{c}_{\tau,1}^{\text{Init}}, \dots, \mathfrak{c}_{\tau,p}^{\text{Init}} \rangle & \mathfrak{c}_{\tau,i}^{\text{Init}} &\text{ is the (given) } i^{\text{th}} \text{ initial class for } \widehat{\tau}, p > 0 \\ \text{ITCE} &= \langle \overline{\mathfrak{c}}_1, \dots, \overline{\mathfrak{c}}_p \rangle & \overline{\mathfrak{c}}_i &\text{ is the } i^{\text{th}} \text{ initial class element} \\ & & &\text{for } \tau(\text{ITCE}), \overline{\mathfrak{c}}_i \in \mathfrak{c}_{\tau,i}^{\text{Init}} \\ \text{TTC}(\widehat{\tau}) &= \langle \mathfrak{c}_{\tau,1}^{\text{Term}}, \dots, \mathfrak{c}_{\tau,q}^{\text{Term}} \rangle & \mathfrak{c}_{\tau,j}^{\text{Term}} &\text{ is the (given) } j^{\text{th}} \text{ terminal class for } \widehat{\tau}. \end{aligned}$$

We denote by  $\mathbf{T}_{\mathcal{C}}$ , or simply  $\mathbf{T}$ , the set of all abstract transforms associated with  $\mathcal{C}$ , and by  $\mathbf{T}_{\mathcal{C}}$ , or simply  $\mathbf{T}$ , the set of all corresponding (concrete) transforms.  $\blacktriangleright$




Figure 30: An illustration of two concrete transforms in which the structural processes are only partially shown.

It is useful to note that a convenient view of the concrete transform is one that takes initial *class system instances* and outputs terminal *class system instances*.

**Remark 3 (on the relationship between transforms and the classes involved).**

When observing two transforms directly “connected” by some class element, it is useful to note that, if a particular initial class element of the top transform is identical to the connecting class element, this means that the top transform simply “regenerated” the corresponding process. Note that, if an initial process is observed “passing through” a transform, i.e. non-interacting with other initial processes, then, when identifying the transform, this process *should not be treated as part of the transform*.  $\blacktriangleright$

We are now ready to introduce another (radical and unique) feature of the proposed formalism, the *natural* emergence of the next stage of representation. Which of the structural elements of the ETS formalism allows this? As suggested in this section, *processes produced by various class generating systems can be subject to various transformations*, thus leading

naturally to a more global hierarchy, introduced next, of structural processes and transforms. The latter hierarchy is supposed to correspond to the more conventional hierarchy of processes in nature.

## 9 Multi-stage inductive structures

In this section, we shall see why the ETS formalism allows a natural transition to the next *stage* of representation. Such a transition consists of the construction of a new (next-stage) set of primitives, which can then be used to introduce next-stage structs, transforms, etc. in a manner similar to that outlined above in this paper.

As was mentioned in the introduction to Part III, one should not confuse levels with the stages introduced in this Section.

**Stage ascension principle.** The pattern of class interactions encapsulated by an abstract transform may be adequately captured at the next representational stage by a new abstract primitive whose initials and terminals are obtained by suppressing the structure of the transform's initial and terminal classes (in the manner described below, in Def. 26). ►

**Notational convention 4.** From this section onwards, notations associated with the next-stage will be marked by the addition of a prime (') to the corresponding present-stage notation. Moreover, the *lower (subscript) index of a mapping name* refers to the codomain of the mapping. ►

We now consider the situation in which the agent has already identified (i.e. constructed) a set of transformations relevant to the present observations.

**Definition 25.** Having identified a set  $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathfrak{C}_1, \mathfrak{C}_2, \dots, \mathfrak{C}_{m'}\}$  of classes in Def. 23, we further assume that a set  $\text{TS}_{\mathcal{C}}$ , or simply  $\text{TS}$ , of abstract transforms,

$$\text{TS}_{\mathcal{C}} = \{\tau_1, \tau_2, \dots, \tau_{n'}\},$$

called a **transformation system**, is also identified. Recall that a generic element  $\tau_i(\text{ITCE})$  of  $\tau_i$  is

$$\tau_i(\text{ITCE}) = \langle \widehat{\tau}_i, \text{ITC}(\widehat{\tau}_i), \text{TTC}(\widehat{\tau}_i), \text{ITCE} \rangle,$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ITC}(\widehat{\tau}_i) &= \langle \mathfrak{C}_{\tau_i, 1}^{\text{Init}}, \dots, \mathfrak{C}_{\tau_i, p(i)}^{\text{Init}} \rangle \\ \text{TTC}(\widehat{\tau}_i) &= \langle \mathfrak{C}_{\tau_i, 1}^{\text{Term}}, \dots, \mathfrak{C}_{\tau_i, q(i)}^{\text{Term}} \rangle. \end{aligned}$$

►

The following definition introduces the concept of next-stage primitive transformation, both abstract and concrete. (Since the structure of the next definition follows that of Def. 1, one might find it useful to review it now.)

**Definition 26.** For the above transformation system  $\text{TS}_{\mathcal{C}}$ , the set  $\mathbb{C}'$  of **next-stage classes** is defined as follows:

$$\mathbb{C}' \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{C'_1, C'_2, \dots, C'_{m'}\},$$

where  $|C'_i| = |\mathfrak{C}_i|$ ,  $1 \leq i \leq m'$ , i.e. we have a bijection

$$\text{abst}_{i\text{-class}} : \mathfrak{C}_i \rightarrow C'_i$$

which abstracts away the *structure* of each element in  $\mathfrak{C}_i$ . The set of **names of next-stage primitives** is:

$$\widehat{\Pi}' \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{\widehat{\tau}_1, \widehat{\tau}_2, \dots, \widehat{\tau}_{m'}\},$$

i.e.  $\widehat{\pi}'_i = \widehat{\tau}_i$ . As in Def. 1, before defining  $\pi'_i$ , we need to introduce the following three concepts. For each  $\widehat{\pi}'_i$ , define the **tuple of initial next-stage classes**

$$\text{Init}(\widehat{\pi}'_i) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle C'_{j_1}, C'_{j_2}, \dots, C'_{j_{p(i)}} \rangle,$$

where

$$C'_{j_k} = \text{abst}_{i\text{-class}}(\mathfrak{C}_{\tau_i, j_k}^{\text{Init}}) \quad 1 \leq k \leq p(i).$$

Then, the **set of next-stage labels associated with  $\pi'_i$**  is

$$\mathcal{L}'_i \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} C'_{j_1} \times C'_{j_2} \times \dots \times C'_{j_{p(i)}}$$

and we have a bijection

$$\begin{aligned} \text{tabst}_{i\text{-labl}} : \mathbf{TCE}_{\text{ITC}(\widehat{\tau}_i)} &\rightarrow \mathcal{L}'_i \\ \text{tabst}_{i\text{-labl}} &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{abst}_{j_1\text{-class}} \times \text{abst}_{j_2\text{-class}} \times \dots \times \text{abst}_{j_{p(i)}\text{-class}}, \end{aligned}$$

hence the name “tuple abstraction” (see Notational Convention 3 and Def. 24), which is defined as a product of mappings. The concept of  $\text{Term}(\widehat{\pi}'_i)$  is defined in a manner similar to  $\text{Init}(\widehat{\pi}'_i)$ .

Define  $\pi'_i$  as a set

$$\pi'_i = \{ \pi'_i(a') \mid a' \in \mathcal{L}'_i \}$$

whose generic element  $\pi'_i(a')$  is:<sup>39</sup>

$$\forall a' \in \mathcal{L}'_i \quad \pi'_i(a') = \pi'_{i a'} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle \widehat{\pi}'_i, \text{Init}(\widehat{\pi}'_i), \text{Term}(\widehat{\pi}'_i), a' \rangle.$$

see Fig. 31. Set  $\pi'_i$  is called a **next-stage abstract primitive transformation**, or simply **next-stage abstract primitive**, and its generic element  $\pi'_{i a'}$  is called a **corresponding (concrete) next-stage primitive**. We denote by  $\widehat{\Pi}'$  the finite set of all next-stage abstract primitives  $\pi'_i$ ,  $1 \leq i \leq n$  and by  $\Pi'$  the set of all (concrete) next-stage primitives.  $\blacktriangleright$




Figure 31: A transform (left) and the corresponding next-stage primitive (right).

Since the structure of a next-stage primitive is absolutely identical to that of the initial-stage primitive, all remaining initial-stage concepts are immediately applicable.

**Definition 27.** Next-stage analogues of definitions 2 through 24 follow immediately. ▶

We are now ready to state a formal version of the above stage ascension principle, which might be viewed as a convenient encapsulation of the main concepts in Def. 26.

**Definition 28.** For the above transformation system  $\mathbb{TS}_{\mathbf{c}}$ ,

$$\mathbb{TS}_{\mathbf{c}} = \{ \tau_1, \tau_2, \dots, \tau_{n'} \},$$

the corresponding **stage transition mappings** (between consecutive stages) are the following three bijective mappings:

$$(i) \quad \text{stage}_{i\text{-class}} : \mathbf{c}_i \rightarrow C'_i \quad 1 \leq i \leq m'$$

$$\text{stage}_{i\text{-class}} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{abst}_{i\text{-class}},$$

$$(ii) \quad \text{stage}_{a\text{-prim}} : \mathbb{TS}_{\mathbf{c}} \rightarrow \mathbf{\Pi}'$$

$$\text{stage}_{a\text{-prim}}(\tau_i) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \pi'_i,$$

$$(iii) \quad \text{stage}_{i\text{-lab}} : \mathbf{TCE}_{\text{ITC}(\widehat{\tau}_i)} \rightarrow \mathcal{L}'_i$$

$$\text{stage}_{i\text{-lab}} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{tabst}_{i\text{-labl}}.$$

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<sup>39</sup> As in Def. 1, both of the following notations, i.e.  $\pi'_i(a')$  and  $\pi'_{i a'}$ , will be used.

►

It is not difficult to see how the above consecutive stage correspondence can be extended to include the following mapping from concrete transforms to concrete primitives:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{stage}_{\text{c-prim}}: \mathbb{T} \rightarrow \Pi' \\ & \text{stage}_{\text{c-prim}}(\tau_i(\text{ITCE})) = \pi'_i(a'), \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\text{stage}_{\text{a-prim}}(\tau_i) = \pi'_i \quad \text{stage}_{\text{i-lab}}(\text{ITCE}) = a'.$$

Finally, we can encapsulate the entire developed mathematical structure as a single concept in the following definition. Note that we substitute the arrow  $\nearrow$  for the various *stage*-mappings.

**Definition 29.** A (single-stage) inductive structure is a pair

$$\langle \mathbf{\Pi}, \text{TS}_{\mathbf{c}} \rangle,$$

where  $\mathbf{\Pi}$  is a set of abstract primitives and  $\text{TS}_{\mathbf{c}}$  is a transformation system. However this pair will also encompass *all relevant concepts*, such as structs and classes at various levels, transforms, etc.

A **multi-stage**, or more precisely an  $l$ -stage, **inductive structure**  $\mathcal{MIS}$  is an  $l$ -tuple<sup>40</sup>

$$\mathcal{MIS} = \langle \langle \mathbf{\Pi}, \text{TS} \rangle, \langle \mathbf{\Pi}', \text{TS}' \rangle, \dots, \langle \mathbf{\Pi}^{(l-1)}, \text{TS}^{(l-1)} \rangle \rangle,$$

where  $\text{TS}^{(l-1)} = \emptyset$ ,  $\langle \mathbf{\Pi}^{(k)}, \text{TS}^{(k)} \rangle$  is the  $k^{\text{th}}$  stage inductive structure, and the transition between two consecutive inductive structures is accomplished in the manner outlined above in this section (see Fig. 32). For the  $k^{\text{th}}$  stage inductive structure in  $\mathcal{MIS}$  we will use the notation

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{MIS}(k) &= \langle \mathbf{\Pi}^{(k)}, \text{TS}^{(k)} \rangle & k &= 0, 1, \dots, l-1 \\ \mathbf{c}_i^{(k)} &\nearrow C_i^{(k+1)} & k &= 0, 1, \dots, l-2 \\ \tau^{(k)} &\nearrow \pi^{(k+1)} & k &= 0, 1, \dots, l-2 \\ \text{ITCE}^{(k)} &\nearrow a^{(k+1)} & k &= 0, 1, \dots, l-2 \\ \tau^{(k)}(\text{ITCE}^{(k)}) &\nearrow \pi^{(k+1)}(a^{(k+1)}) \quad \text{or} \quad \tau_{\text{ITCE}^{(k)}}^{(k)} &\nearrow \pi_{a^{(k+1)}}^{(k+1)} & k &= 0, 1, \dots, l-2, \end{aligned}$$

where the arrow  $\nearrow$  stands for the appropriate *stage*-mapping. ►

<sup>40</sup> For simplicity, we drop the index  $\mathbf{c}^{(k)}$  from  $\text{TS}_{\mathbf{c}^{(k)}}^{(k)}$ .

In general, we expect that as stages emerge, the lower stages gradually rigidify, i.e. stabilize, and do so at a faster pace than the upper stages.

Finally, it is important to note that, for example, a class identified at stage 3 is not readily identified at stage 1 even though it also “exists” at that stage, hence the main role of stages.

**Important Remark 4.** As to the choice of the basic representational stage (stage 0)—and thus the stage 0 primitives—it is useful to make sure that most stage 0 classes persist, i.e. *can be reliably observed between transforms*, for a reasonable period of time. Otherwise, the constructed multi-stage inductive structure is unreliable. This consideration should guide the evaluation of the quality of the initial representation stage. ▮




Figure 32: Schematic representation of a multi-stage inductive structure.

## Part V

# Conclusion

I do admit that at any moment we are prisoners caught in the framework of our theories; our expectations; our past experiences; our language. But we are prisoners in a Pickwickian sense: if we try we can break out of our framework at any time. Admittedly, we shall find ourselves again in a framework, but it will be a better and roomier one; and we can at any moment break out of it again.

.....  
The Myth of the Framework is, in our time, the central bulwark of irrationalism. My counter-thesis is that it simply exaggerates a difficulty into an impossibility. The difficulty of discussion between people brought up in different frameworks is to be admitted. *But nothing is more fruitful than such a discussion; than the culture clash which has stimulated some of the greatest intellectual revolutions.*

Karl Popper, Normal science and its dangers, 1970 (our emphasis)

## 10 Preliminary thoughts on learning

In this section, we briefly discuss our preliminary ideas regarding (inductive) learning. In general, we strongly believe that, from an applied point of view and for the near future at least, the emphasis in learning should be less on the statistical activity *called* learning and more on the (structural) representational issues, as follows from Parts III and IV. In our framework, it should not come as a surprise that learning is, in fact, learning of classes and transforms.

As far as the learning of classes is concerned, we mean, of course, the learning of classes of structural entities (both initial and terminal). By the learning of classes, we mean the discovery of classes of structural entities (both initial and terminal). This discovery involves the construction of application-specific class generating systems, which in turn involve some (structural) optimization process, based on a “training set”<sup>41</sup>. Considering, for example, the case when one is faced with learning a level 2 class representation, and assuming that the necessary constituent classes at levels 0 and 1 have previously been learned, the optimization process is related to the selection of optimal constraints,  $\{\text{Con}_{j,i}^2(\mathcal{C}_{j,i}^1)\}_{i \in I}$ , understood in terms of optimizing its “structural simplicity”. An appropriate consistency measure should indicate when it is impossible to do so, i.e. when the available constituent classes are inadequate, or insufficient. Note that, to learn a level 2 class, the training elements must be represented as level 2 structs (which, in turn, require the relevant level 1 classes, level 1 structs, and so on).

Once almost all of the identified/learned class elements maintain their integrity, or autonomy, for a sufficiently long period of time, we call them *structural processes* for that

---

<sup>41</sup> Ideally, by a training set, we mean a non-conventional analogue of the traditional concept, associated with the result of a “sophisticated”, dynamic process of interaction between an observer and the target process—mediated by a *structural* (as opposed to numeric) measurement subprocess, which delivers structs. However, in the immediate future, it is obviously necessary for developers to intuit (and postulate) such a dynamic process.

representational stage, at which point one can proceed with the identification of transforms and transition to the next stage.

Next, recalling that a transform encapsulates the pattern of interaction of several structural processes, one can first identify transforms (relying on the initial and terminal class representations) and then, if necessary, modify the corresponding class representations if the “transform evidence” suggests their inadequacy.

As far as computational complexity issues are concerned, we note that, *computationally*, learning is bounded by the number of various restricted partitions of the training structs (each into an assembly of substructs). The computational cost associated with the construction of a candidate optimal partition appears to be low order polynomial, since, locally, a struct is “almost linear”: although the “width” of an entire struct is not constant, the width (and also length) of the substructs is always bounded by a small number (since, for all primitives, the branching factor is bounded by the maximal number of terminals). In addition, with each new stage of representation, since the size of the next-stage struct shrinks by at least an order of magnitude as compared to its previous-stage counterpart, the complexity of learning at the new stage is also reduced. Recall that we have assumed (and this assumption seems to be borne out by reality) that the number of classes at each stage is relatively small, as is the number of levels for various class generating systems within a stage.

## 11 How one should approach the ETS formalism

This section was written to address the situation we often find ourselves in when presenting talks on the ETS formalism. At the end of a talk, instead of discussing the various features of the formalism, we are usually faced with answering the following questions (common in PR and ML communities): “Did you compare the performance of your approach with that of neural networks (or some other popular model)?” We would like to stress that this type of question is currently quite unproductive. Such questions presume that an evaluation of ETS should proceed under conventional assumptions, i.e. the *first thing* one should do is to compare the performance of ETS learning algorithms with other learning algorithms. Even a cursory reading of this paper should immediately suggest that the very formulation of the *inductive learning problem* has changed radically and thus “the first thing one should do” is to better understand what this new formulation offers, rather than focusing *prematurely* on non-central issues.

So, which new insights into the nature of the inductive learning problem does the ETS formalism offer? It turns out that the new formulation of this problem (see also a quotation from Vapnik and Chervonenkis given in [69], online) can be stated as follows: given a small training set for a class, construct the corresponding *class representation*. As one can now see, for the first time, the concept of class representation comes to the fore. So what is a ‘class representation’? Although a *hint* at the answer to this question was suggested by the concept of generative grammars (i.e. a set of production rules), as we discussed in Section 1.5, this answer is inadequate for a more profound reason: the lack of *representational* formalisms in science in general, and in mathematics in particular ([10]). Put simply, there is no adequate formal representational setting for strings as object representations, and therefore all constructions based on such an unsound foundation cannot be effective. Thus,

the new problem formulation inevitably focuses ones attention on the very profound issues of both class and object representations, since the former cannot be properly addressed without the latter. Again, as can be seen from this paper, the development of the underlying representational formalism turned out to be an enormous undertaking.

Returning to the issue of the *evaluation* of the ETS formalism, the immediate focus should be on answering the following kinds of scientific questions:

- Is the new (multi-level struct) representation more useful and/or powerful as the primary form of representation? That is, given a concrete application, develop an intuition about struct representation in that setting, and then ask the question, “Do these structs contain additional, important information about the actual objects/processes of the application?”<sup>42</sup>

If the struct concept, as defined in this paper, turns out to be somewhat inadequate as a primary form of representation, can it be “repaired” within the current overall framework, or does the framework itself have to be rethought?

- What is an appropriate generalization of the concepts of structural constraint (Def. 9)?
- Can the proposed concept of class representation fulfill its intended purpose? Is the proposed overall approach to the class generating system a sufficiently powerful way of describing, or representing, actual classes in the chosen applied setting? Is the link between a small training set and its corresponding class representation computationally effective? In fact, it should be clear that the introduced concept of multi-level struct substantially reduces the gap between representations of objects and their classes as it exists in the current formalisms.
- What are the options for introducing a more explicit concept of transform, aligned with the definition of class generating system (once the above choice of the definition of a class generating system is made)?
- In particular, what is an appropriate answer to the intuitive notion of “adjacency” of structural processes in a transform?
- What are the options for addressing the specification of the generative mechanism in the definition of class representation? A closely related issue is the one mentioned in Important Remark 3 on p. 50, i.e. how do we adequately generalize the concept of primitive attachment to the constituent class elements in a higher-level struct?

At this stage, we believe that the most productive way to approach these issues is by exploring in a concrete empirical setting the nature of the class generating system by building class representations for the corresponding training structs (from level 0 structs, to level 0 classes, to level 1 structs, level 1 classes, etc., eventually considering transforms).

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<sup>42</sup> We believe that there is preliminary support for this claim, e.g. for the first time, an object’s formative history is now a part of the representation.

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